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1. University Guidelines / Notes
la. University Guidelines
The Guidelines for the Context Statement are published by the University as follows:
• A description of the limitations of the research
PhD by Published Works
Context Statement: Notes of Guidance
The 10,000-15,000 word context paper is, in effect, an expansion of the 500 word abstract written as
part of the case for submission for the degree of PhD by published works. Its function is to help the
examiners to set the submitted works in context; it could act as the basis for an article or articles for
publication. Its intention is to justify the claim for the award for PhD by adding a critical overview of
research underpinning the submission. It should include the following:
• A background to and critical review of the selected works, including a summary of the works selected
• A clear argument as to how the works relate to each other
• Evidence and exemplification of claims made that the research constitutes a significant and original
contribution to knowledge
• Evidence and exemplification of claims made that the selected works are equivalent to a PhD by the
conventional (thesis) route
• An account and critique of research methodologies used in the research
• A critical review of the candidate's development as a researcher over the period of the research
lb. Notes
A The requirement topresent a clear argument as to how the works relate to each other is not applicable
in this case since only a single work is submitted for evaluation.
B. The selected (published) work is herein referred to either as the published work, or by its name. i.e.
Global Terrorism.
C. This Context Statement consists of 14, 605 words (+ the photo illustrations and annexes)
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2. Background to the Selected Work
The background to Global Terrorism and it's research began in earnest in 1987 while I was
serving with UNIFlL 1, and continued in subsequent UN Peacekeeping Missions, including a second tour
in UNIFlL during 1993 2.
While a number of UNIFlL staff would return each evening across the border from Lebanon to
the comparatively safe environment of Israel, I was among those staff who resided in Lebanon,
specifically in a village named Alma a' Shab, located in the south-
western extremity of the country (please see Annex A) .
This village was located two kilometres north of the Israeli
border, five kilometres east from UNIFIL
Headquarters at Naqoura (a Muslim village),
and approximately ten kilometres south
from the seaside city of Sur 3 - which was at
that time, a PLO .. and Hizballah 5
stronghold. This Christian village was under
control of the so-called South Lebanese
Army 6, since disbanded, with some of its
members now serving long prison sentences
for treason, war crimes and gross human
rights violations such as torture, committed at the notorious Khiam jail. The vast
majority of the village's inhabitants had members or relatives serving in the SLA.
Most were volunteers, but a number were pressed into service.
1 L 01100. atiore Interim Force in I ebanon, a light!) armed peacekeeping force of some 6000 troops ill six battalions, logistics, and medical units,
:: To \1<" the latest opcraiiooal map of'L" ·Im... please refer to Annex A
, Arabic In English, It is known II! Tyre. Menuoned in Bible: First Kings 5, 1-18.
4 Palestinian [Jb..~Uron Organisation.
~ Arahic Pam of iOO (I1e7h Hizb part) •. \Ilah God).
6 N)()\\T\ cornmonlv b\ It'S acronym, the SU. 11was Israeli's surrogate militia in Lcb:mO!l, and was comprised mainly of Christians, but with some Muslims.
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In the climate of the Lebanese civil war, in which over 100 identifiable factions, militias, guerrilla and
terrorist groups took part, UN duty frequently entailed travel in the Area
of Operations (termed the AD) and consequently, encounters with a wide
variety of allied and opposing factions occurred, often informally but
also formally, in connection with operational issues such as
negotiating or ensuring safe passage.
Owing to the UN's position of neutrality, it was quite
commonplace when in contact with members of the various factions, to
strike up conversation and even to elicit information, although factions
such as Hizballah were notably more constrained than Palestinian and
other Lebanese factions, owing to a strong sense of security awareness,
based in turn upon the notion that all foreigners were potential spies.
Overall, many members of these factions and also members of
the Israeli Defence Force and their surrogate militia, the SLA, were quite
lucid and often initiated informal conversation. This is perhaps owing to
the Levantine inclination for energetic hospitality towards strangers or
foreigners (in paradox to their seemingly renowned capacity for ruthless
Tbe UNIFIL war memorial violence, when in dispute \ more so than Europeans who seem
noticeably more conservative or reserved in comparison, but who are no
less altruistic for that.
Peaceful and neutral interaction between the UN and local inhabitants of all factions was the
general rule, and also a UN objective in order to engender confidence-building measures among all parties
to the dispute; but there were exceptions to this even from the inception of the Mission. The war memorial
at UNIFIL Headquarters stands silent witness to the 246 UN peacekeepers that lost their lives in Lebanon
since 1978, from shooting, bombs, abduction and murder, bombardment and mines.
In a climate of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare and
terrorism, the conflict unsurprisingly engendered in many of the UNIFIL
staff';an unavoidable awareness and interest, not least in terrorism.
I was no exception to this, and decided to record my experiences
for use at some later date - I thought at the time that they might form the
basis for memoirs. In 1988 I attended an informal memorial service at an
UNTSO R station for an Australian Military Observer. He was murdered
after a anti-tank mine was deliberately planted for the return leg of his
journey in a UN patrol jeep. His patrol partner, a Canadian officer who
barely survived, very nearly bled to death after crawling for almost half a
kilometre, crippled with catastrophic leg wounds.
The memorial service was conducted by a colleague of mine, Lt.
Col. Richard Higgins 9, who himself was abducted just over a month
later by Hizballah terrorists. They eventually murdered him after a
protracted and torturous incarceration; his remains were later thrown
callously onto a Beirut street from a moving vehicle. These poignant
events in such a short space of time, compelled my resolve to make
thorough study of the dispute in the middle east, especially of terrorism.
I began to initiate penetrating enquiries, and noted the findings Militiaman in south Lebanon
urular traits \\ re noted b)' T E Law renee 1/1 Seven Pillars of Wisdom. namely, a far wider scale of emotions, both positive and
ncgatr,
United auons Truce upervision Orgarusation, Consists of UN Military Observers operating in parallel to UNIFIL, but under
an earlier mandate stemnung from 194-8.and unlike the battalions of UNIFIL, being all of officer rank and unarmed.
U Marine orps, on secondment to the UNTSO Observer Group inLebanon, where he served as station chief.
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with the aim to see it eventually disseminated -
partly as a sort of tribute, but also as it seemed
important to try to bring an understanding of
such events to a wider public notice, since
western media coverage of terrorism in
developing countries tends to be quite sparse.
I subsequently took pains to make
dedicated contact with members of as many
factions and parties as I possibly could, on as
many occasions as possible, sometimes under
hostile circumstances. It included contacts and
conversational enquiries with those remnants
of the Government Army, Gendarmerie and
Liaison Officers. These contacts were
facilitated by frequent travel through the Area of Operations and by residing in Lebanon. It was at
this time, that my interest could fairly be said to have turned into formal research.
In late 1993 I began working in UNMOGIP 10 the UN Mission in India, Pakistan and
Kashmir. By this time I had firmly focused my research upon terrorism and I practiced the same
methodology that had proved so effective in Lebanon.
The main physical area of this research was within the old 1947 borders of the Jammu &
Kashmir state 11, where the ceasefire line (800 leilometres long) separates the two sectors occupied
by India and Pakistan, and in various proximities to which, there are located twelve of the
seventeen UNMOGIP Field Stations and Headquarters' 12 (please see Annex C).
What became immediately apparent to me
was the size of the operational area. While
Lebanon spanned some 10,400 square kilometres,
Jammu & Kashmir is 222,236 square kilometres
13. This provided an almost endless source of
invaluable research opportunities, additional to
those related operational areas outside of Kashmir
in India and Pakistan, and the occasional travel to
Afghanistan, during the formative years of the
Taliban 1...
The conflict in Kashmir was in many
ways more intense and high profile than in
Lebanon. Hardly a day would pass in the Kashmir
winter UN headquarters of Srinagar, without the
sound of a grenade explosion or small arms fire in the distance, sometimes closer.
UNMOGIP Summer Headquarters. Srinazar, Kashmir
J United allons Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Spans the ceasefire line (termed Line of Control) between India
and Pakistan, "hi h mostly runs through the Jammu & Kaslunir State (Indian-held), Azad (or Liberated) Kashmir (Pakistani -
held). but also a sector ofthc Punjab tate (IndIO)and Punjab Province (Pakistan). and lastly, the Northern Areas (part a/the old.!K
state tn 19-1"' before the partuton of lndia. 771e \'orthem .1reas are considered aspart a/Kashmir by India but not by Paki tan).
TIl JK tate i now disputed b) both India. Pakistan (who respectively both occupy sectors) and independence separatists.
ummer HQ is In nragar (Indian sector). wmter HQ is in Rawalpitrli (nr. Islamabad Pakistan) with a liaison office in New Delhi.
Sec Anne'. 8 for a map of the JK tale. Punjab and orthem Areas.
TIle rcgim ,\ hich C\ cntually took control of most of Afgharustan. and which allied with AI Qa 'ida until toppled in 200 l.
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Itwas at this time, under circumstances of
isolation for several weeks (owing to the
Monsoon), that I had the opportunity to recall
relevant events from my UN service in Angola 15
and convert recollections into notes. Angola was
a useful experience as far as terrorism and
guerrilla warfare was concerned, since while
there, I was engaged in several fire fights against
irregular armed elements, and later negotiated
release after being held by armed elements with
another UN member.
I also took the opportunity at this time to
commit to structured note form, relevant
experiences when serving with UN on the Golan
heights, and from several years before, when
serving in the UK Police and TAVR.
In all of the peacekeeping missions that I served in, I was fortunate in so far as my functions
were nearly always of a security, political or logistics nature. This demanded and facilitated wide
travel within the mission areas, resulting in my assimilating a great deal of information on the
subjects of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. My political position in UNMOGIP (as the Political
Assistant to the General Officer Commanding) was a particularly fortunate one in this regard, since
our mandate's main objective was to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan; something
breached almost daily not only by regular armed forces, but mainly by irregular armed elements
infiltrating into the Indian side of Kashmir - guerrillas and terrorists.
I tried to devise the method by which this research could best be disseminated. Having
published no works before, a conventional book seemed out of the question, at least before a great
deal of time might pass as I attempted to acquire the necessary literary skills.
Some time later, I recalled the courses on peacekeeping topics that I had taken in recent
years with the UN Institute for Training & Research, with its programme for correspondence course
studies.
These were clearly courses and written works relating to mainstream peacekeeping topics,
but I wished to write about terrorism.
Based on my experiences in the
field however, I had come to view terrorism
in a somewhat untypical light for a
European. Airliner hijackings, bombings by
the Baader Meinhof gang, the IRA or ETA
were quite clearly terrorism through
western eyes which tended to view foreign
conflicts such as those in south Lebanon or
Kashmir, simply as regular and irregular
armed conflict.
I had found that regular armed
forces took part in those conflicts as well as
guerrillas (according to the Geneva
convention stipulations concerning lawful
armed combatants), and also what were
UN Military and Political personnel (and
candidate-student) in Mavinga, Angola, walking
through the middle of a UNITA GuerriUa field
headquarters (located immediately on both sides
of the track - extremely well camouflaged).
Jammu Kashmir Liber.uion Front militants inKashmir-
both guerrillas and terrorists in the same group
IS 1989-1992. J had made the barest of notes during my time in Angola. owing 10 pressure of work and the intensity of the
conflict.
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quite clearly terrorists. I had further appreciated, that unlike European terrorist groups, there were
armed groups whose membership frequently comprised both lawful guerrillas and unlawful
terrorists.
Coupled with the knowledge of the abductions, bombings, assassinations and the like that
periodically occurred in several UN peacekeeping missions, it gradually occurred to me, that
Terrorism might reasonably be considered a relevant topic to peacekeeping.
In presenting this case to the Director of UNIT AR (who is also a William & Mary
departmental Chair), I was pleasantly surprised to find that both he and the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) fully concurred with this view, and I subsequently proposed that
I author a work on terrorism for UNIT AR, in a format suitable to be used academic learning.
After presentation of relevant credentials, this proposal was accepted by UNIT AR and
DPKO, and I subsequently authored Global Terrorism in my own time from 1998 to almost the end
of 1999, when it was first published.
I began almost immediately afterwards to gather further research information, in order to
extensively update and illustrate Global Terrorism, and subsequently, a revised, full edition was
published in late 2002. It included new information that I had assembled in Geneva and Vienna,
from several local police and terrorist 16 sources that I was in contact with, partly owing to my
position as a UN security manager.
UNIT AR has received enrolments to study Global Terrorism from students in over twenty
countries. It is also used at institutions such as the American Military University 17 (both at
Graduate and Undergraduate level) and the US Department of Agriculture, which offers the course
internally.
This concludes the Description of the Background to the Selected Work
KLA iKosovo Liberation ..Jm~\' or I.'shtria Clirimtare E Kosoves UCK), Assyrian Liberation Party (Hezb ul Tahir AI Ashur),
and PKK (Parttya Karkeren Kurdisian or Kurdistan Worker. Party) which in2002 changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom
and Democracy Congress tKongrey '0Azadi Ii Demokrasiye yo Kurdistane or KADuj.
t Part of the Amcnc:an Public University System.
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3. Critical Review of the Selected Work
Global Terrorism, it is suggested, attempts to fill a void in the study of terrorism, in providing a
formal study textbook, in the true academic sense. By commencing with formal lesson plans and pre-
designated scope and learning objectives, some degree of order and confidence is instilled in the student
embarking on the learning process in this field, while in conclusion, the tests gauge assimilation of the
knowledge and provide a stable and coherent objective from the outset.
There are few if any such textbooks written on terrorism in such format; the majority of works
take a standard literary form, and are without the benefit of academic mechanisms to guide learning and
test assimilation of the knowledge.
One of the best contemporary works is Terrorism Today 18, but even
this does not adopt a firm learning format, unlike Global Terrorism, and quite
deliberately so, since despite an effort to generate some academic use, it is
chiefly designed to compete in the mainstream commercial market of general
works on terrorism. Terrorism Today digresses rapidly (after some 46 pages)
into a catalogue of recent historical terrorism on a geographical basis; some
two-thirds of the book is spent on description of disputes in over 65 countries.
This is very useful as a reference work for relevant tasks such as
establishing continental patterns of terrorism, but it cannot properly be
considered as a thorough rendering of the terrorism topic. e.g. There is no
detailed learning material concerning weapons, making it quite difficult to
understand this key issue, which often determines the type of terrorist act Terrorism Today - a
(according to availability of weapons or the ability to improvise and partial attempt at academic
construct them), and is very significant to evading detection by security format, but constrainedbythe commercial concerns of
forces. This subject is very important when considering the widespread 'de arketing.
terrorist use of bombs that are improvised, and not constructed at industrial L-Wl_r_m _J
level. A detailed rendering of Weapons is essential to understanding WMD 19, a serious terrorist threat.
In this review, something of the relevance of Global Terrorism's topic should be justified: The
academic times in which we live seem characterised by a penetrating diversity of research within
disciplines and into sub-disciplines of those, many of which were hitherto non-existent some few
decades ago. Some of these sub-disciplines straddle several disciplines, and not altogether comfortably.
i.e. The main body of terrorism study seems to lie within the traditional, established discipline of
Political Science, but also sometimes that of Criminal Justice and nigh de-facto departments such as
Unconventional Warfare, in those recent Universities with abstract, sometimes obscure military
leanings.
In defence of this, I would say that while penetrating study into such diverse topics as terrorism
may not perhaps be the most desirable priority in the climate of contemporary academic tragedy - of
lapsing classical liberal education 20, terrorism is an increasingly significant social reality of our time. It's
study is further redeemed by the fact that if we adhere to and accept the literal meaning of the word
(rooted in Teror, Terere) , then terrorism spans back to before the time of Christ; its relevance is thereby
more readily justified.
In resuming the critical review of published work, it is further revealed that Global Terrorism
strives to be absolute, to be thorough and to discuss, at least in a respectable depth, all topics that could
1 Terrorism Today TI1C Past. the Players, the Future. Spindlove and Simonsen Prentice Hall. 2000. ISBN; 0-02-301731-7.
1 Weapons ofMa Destruction: uclear. Biological Chemical and Radiological weapons.
According to TIle Great Conversation (Great Books of the Western World) - Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899-1977.
Form Chairman of the Britannia Board of Editors, University and Foundation President. Encyclopaedia Britannica /
University of Chicago). 1952. I B : 0-8-229-476-X.
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conceivably be related to terrorism. Most if not all
contemporary works fail to achieve this, and most
even to attempt it; Global Terrorism is projected as
an exception to this trend. Notwithstanding this, it
bears mention that a governing factor in constructing
Global Terrorism was to confine it to a reasonable
length, which somewhat hampered efforts towards
the very comprehensiveness that it sought to achieve.
Constraints upon length were imposed for two
reasons - firstly, so as not to overwhelm new or
intermediate students engaging in study of the topic,
and secondly, the objective was to dissect the topic
into a logical, sequential and manageable study
programme (as opposed to creating a work on some
select or limited aspect of terrorism), not a lengthy
encyclopaedic reference work., of shallow and brief definitions, formatted essentially for retrieval, with
little or no discussion.
To credibly discuss all topics related to terrorism, it was necessary to research to the extent of
not merely assimilating batteries of facts, but to an extent which permitted with some authority,
discrimination of fact from inaccuracy or unsubstantiated fact - of being able to determine what is
accurate, what might be accurate, and what falls into the category of often convincing but
unsubstantiated conjecture, or fiction. If the text of Global Terrorism appears thorough and confident, it
is a consequence of the underlying research and study of fields, not confined to related legislation and
philosophy, but extended to military, police, logistical, ordnance and other topics; including elements of
sociology, anthropology, history, political science and international law. To an extent, even biology,
chemistry and physics have been delved into, in order to comprehend not only the political,
consequential and practical acquisition (and use) of Weapons of Mass Destruction, but to explain their
components and effect.
My first strategy in formulating Global Terrorism, was not to research the popular subjects on
the topic (such as hijacking, car bombings and the /ike), but to determine what was uncommon or not
included in most works. After determining what I believe terrorism to be - which is a process in my
opinion, that must be as brief: clinical and literal as possible, I set to work on researching the historical
aspects of terrorism. Global terrorism reflects my perception of terrorism, not terrorism's associations or
consequences, so much as its most intrinsic
characteristic - terror. This motivated inclusion in
Global Terrorism of certain types of war crime and
diverse instances of terrorism such as piracy and the
witchcraze.
In the absence of an internationally accepted
definition, I experienced some difficulty in adhering
strictly to that body of modem thought which frequently
seems to confine terrorism to a period beginning at
Dawson's Field, Jordan, in 1970. This is popularly
believed to have been the first of many widely
Carpathian women and children at Auschwitz in
publicised hijackings, but which in fact followed on 1944-evidenceofanearliertemnism.
from 1968 , and is actually an old phenomena, which
Cairo Airport 1970,when the PFLP blew up a
747 jet - a period popularly perceived as the
beginnin~ of teITOrism.
TI1C Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al jet airliner and forced it to Algeria to
coerce release of political prisoners.
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dates from the 1930s 22.
Few of the authors who delineate
terrorism from the 1960s or 1970s onwards, could
convincingly assert that absolute terror preceding
violently unnatural death, was not the case when
an approaching 18th century pirate ship would take
down the Jolly Roger and run up the red flag
(signifying that all on board would die by cutlass
or be thrown to sharks). The same principle
applied to those misfortunate Jews, Gypsies and
others, herded into queue to be murdered in gas
chambers, and in the cases of the 100,000
A wdl documented eracl terrorism - the Wrtch burnings European women who mostly after torture, were
burnt to death, hanged or drowned, for so-called
witchcraft. In filet: these instances seem more authentically terrorism, than the arson of an unattended
pharmacy by the Animal Liberation Front. Global terrorism therefore puts much emphasis upon
historical instances of terrorism.
Concerning the sequence and content of Global Terrorism, the format and method of study
instructions are followed by the list of contents and a lengthy introduction. The latter is calculated to
stimulate the reader's interest and gently draw them in, initiating a staged introduction to a set of sub-
topics which are diverse and at times, complex.
The order of the lessons and their content in Global Terrorism were planned according to the
most logical sequence and that which would be the easiest to assimilate.
e.g. It was important to immediately differentiate guerrilla warfare from terrorism; hence it's
appearance in the first lesson.
The subject of defining terrorism was left until the second lesson, in order to first draw the
reader's attention to some of the interesting and diverse historical instances of terrorism, rather then
immediately engage in the somewhat dry issues concerning the legal wrangling of defining terrorism.
Lessons three and four intentionally discuss motives and so called justifications as a pre-cursor
to lesson 5 where terrorists and their groups are profiled.
The next lesson (weapons) was placed in the middle of Global Terrorism, and calculated to
stimulate a resurgence of reader interest mid-way, since it is a terrorism subject of above-average
popular interest.
Lessons concerning tactics, targets and victims follow on, then the subjects of the Cold War,
media and anti- / counter-terrorism.
The lessons conclude with the relationship of the United nations organisation towards terrorism
and some thought is devoted to the envisaged future of terrorism.
The nineteen annexes provide a reference bank:on a wide variety of subjects that students may
wish to study or retrieve data from, including: a list of groups accused of terrorism (basic details); a
history of international attacks; NBC 23 weapons and effect; a list of current international anti-terrorism
legislation, and maps of where Al Qa'ida members and trained Mujahideen are respectively
concentrated and located. Importantly, these annexes also include photo archives of genocide and war
crimes from different periods, which relate to case studies presented in four different lessons. These
serve as powerful and evocative visual aids to the case studies, and afford, if not reality, a higher level of
2111February 1931 at III Permian cit) of Arequipa a group of rebel soldiers forced two American pilots to fly them
about and drop propaganda leafl t oyer Lima. TIle first case of skyjacking in the US OCCurred on 1stMay, 1961 when a man
forced a commercial airliner to detour [rom Miarru to KC) West Florida.
u lear. Biolo leal and herrucal (nuclear given 111 the context a/terrorist weapons to mean fission, fusion and
radioloetcal)
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consciousness and impression which cannot be achieved by text alone. The illustrations in Global
Terrorism originate from some 48 different sources and my personal collections.
Although only factual knowledge and concepts can be tested by the final examination (as they
are at the end of the twelve end-of-lesson quizzes), collectively, if the broad range of learning materials
inGlobal Terrorism is properly assimilated by students, they should confidently be able to:
a) Outline the origins and history of terrorism, and describe the evolution of contemporary terrorism
from guerrilla warfiue.
b) Differentiate between transnational, international and domestic terrorism, further discriminate
between guerrilla warfire and terrorism, and understand their status according to the Geneva
Conventions and other International Instruments.
c) Analyze terrorism in the different political climates of war, peace, democracy and authoritarianism.
d) Segregate sponsorship of terrorism from religious, diplomatic, political and spiritual support of
terrorism, and understand the relationship between media and terrorism.
e) Differentiate between terrorist victims and targets; broadly describe the logistics and mechanics of
terrorism: terrorist weapons, preferences, acts, objectives and tactics; and be able to outline practical
anti-tenorism issues such as choke points, kill zones, target hardening and layered security.
t) Cite the essential elements which characterise the majority of contemporary terrorist acts and
understand the wide range ofboth proclaimed and concealed terrorist motives.
g) Comprehend terrorism during and since the cold war, desaibe the new wave of terrorism which
distorts and misuses religious dogma, and command a basic grasp of the types of forces, organisations,
laws and other tangible measures used to prevent and suppress terrorism
h) Discuss the future of terrorism and realistic possibilities to defeat its roots, vis-a-vis temporary
suppression and aisis response measures.
i) Undertake an independent and methodical analysis of any given case of terrorism, and to arrive at a
detailed and aedible conclusion, within the confines of the infonnation available.
This concludes tbe Critical Review of tbe Selected Work
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4. Summary of the Selected Work
Global Terrorism is best summarised as: a self contained
textbook on the subject of terrorism, versatile in its suitability for both
distance and classroom learning, either according to a fixed academic
schedule, or one which is self-paced.
Moreover, it notably renders the subject of terrorism in both
span and depth to a degree rarely, if at all, found in other contemporary
works on the topic. Global Terrorism also includes some hitherto
unassembled research findings, and creative invention (definitions and
formula).
Furthermore, serious dedication has been applied to presenting
Global Terrorism in an academic format, which is demonstrated by
virtue of:
a) Descriptive and explanatory instructions concerning the Course Format.
b) Instructions concerning the Method of Study proposed for distance learning.
c) A full List of Contents detailing the entire syllabus.
d) A lengthy and protracted Introduction for adequate preparatory purposes.
e) 12 distinct Lessons with titles and sub titles indicating the content syllabus.
f) Clear and pre-stated Scope and Objectives for each of the 12 lessons.
g) Heavily illustrated throughout (475 illustrations).
h) Richly presented text (frequent bulleting and numbering, and 50 tables/charts).
i) Four major case studies.
j) 12 historically notable Terrorist attack briefs (concise facts of the cases).
k) 12 vocabulary tables (Keywords to Note).
1) Each of the 12 Lessons concluding in an End-of-Lesson Quiz (test) of20 questions, to gauge assimilation.
m) 19 Annexes: wide-ranging scientific, political, historical and other reference information and photographs.
n) A Final Examination and award ofa certificate of completion for reaching a pass standard (75%).
0) The author (candidate student) standing as mentor for all enrolled students (gratis and in own time).
Finally, Global Terrorism has fortunately attracted enrolments from several hundred students,
both independently and through institutions such as the US Government and Universities (at
Graduate and undergraduate levei).
Several hundreds of students have enrolled from over 20 countries, and include police,
military, security and intelligence personnel, notably a number being from the UK Ministry of
Defence, US State Department and Pentagon, up to and including the General Officer level.
Author ( andidate-studenq and Global Terrorism were briefly mentioned by the United
Nations ecretary-GeneraL in his report to the UN General Assembly on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism (Report number A/55/179).
For further information related to the summary of the published work, the List of Contents in
lobal Terrorism i reproduced (jar convenience if so required) as follows:
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d) Recn.itment e) Surrrnary. Section 5.2: Structure and Practice of Terrorist Organizations. a) Leadershp, Operational, Political and Spiritual.
b) Inblligence and Roconnaissance. c) Security and Crunter-Intelligence. d) Organising Terrorist Acts. e) Logistics. n Recruitment Training
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Commercially AvailOOle Conmunications Facilities. n Fundng; Illegally-Generated and Sponsored. g) Negotiating Options. h) Diplomatic
Immunity. i) IndviciJal Sponsorship. j) Sponsorship by Govemments. k) Rogue Intelligence and Security Personnel. I) Keywords to Note.
m) Terrorist Attack Brief: Attacks on Cafes, San SaIvaOOr, El SaIvaOOr.
Lesson 7: Types of Terrorist Acts. Section 7.1: Extreme Violence. a) Terrorist Preferences. b) Systematic Genocide and
Spontaneous Massacre. c) Rancbm Murder, Woundng and Mutilation. d) Selective Murder and Woundng. e) Forced Suidde of Victims
CoIrpeIled to Engage in Terrcxist Acts. n DeiXlPlllation or Ethnic Cleansing. g) Political Purges. Section 7.2: Other Crimes. a)
Destruction or Damage of Structures, Resources, Craft and other Property. b) Hijacking, KidnaWing, Siege-and-Hostage Situations. c)
Racketeering, Extortion, Drug Trafficking and other Crimes. d) Destruction or Disruption of Information and Networks. e) Poisoning of
Consumer Food Products. n Brainwashing and Psychological Warfare. g) Threats and Hoax Threats of Terrorist Action. h) Case Study:
The US Embassy Borrbing, NairOOi, 7th August 1998. i) Keywords to Note. j) Terrorist Attack Brief: Murder of UK Defence Attache,
Athens, Greece ..
Lesson 8: Terrorist Tactics and the Targets of Terrorism. Section 8.1: Terrorist Tactics. a) Pursuit of Political Status. b)
Blackmail and Compfioo of Officials. c) Covert Penetration of Security Forces and Target Circles. d) Provision of Clandestine Interviews
with Mada. e) Dissemination of Inflammatory Material, Disinformation and Propaganda. n Breaking of Agreements. Section 8.2: Targets
of Terronsm a) Evaluation and Selection of Targets. b) Govemment Institutions. c) Intemational and Non-Govemmental (NGO)
Organisations. d) Commerdal Enterprises. e) Ethnic, Political and Religious Groups. f) Rival Criminal Groups. g) Indviduals. h)
Keywords to Note. i) Terrorist Attack Brief: Attack on US Officers Cllb, Rome, Italy.
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Govemmental, Intemational and NGO Civil Servants. d) Leaders in Society. e) Commercial Enterprises. f) Democracy. g) Global,
Regional and National Security. h) Societies and Environment i) Rival Criminals. j) Case Stud)'; Jammu and Kashmir. k) Keywords to
Note. i) Terrorist Attack Brief: Attack on CIA Officers, Langley (McLean), Virginia, USA.
Lesson 10: Terrorism and the Cold War; Terrorism and the Media. Section 10.1: Terrorism During the Cold War. a)
Sponsorship. b) Organisation and Training. c) Coalitions. Section 10.2: Terrorism Since the Cold War. a) Resumption and Re-
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Forces OJ::posingTerrorism. c) Anti-Terrorism and Special Police Formations. d) Notes on Anti-Terrorism Security. e) Counter-Terrorism
and Military Special Forces. 1) Assessing Terrorist Threats. Section 11.2: Tactics. a) Intelligence Security. b) Security Intelligence. c)
Negotiation. d) Concession. e) Deterrent f) Case Study: AI Oa'ida attacks on the US: 9/11/01. g) Keywords to Note. h) Terrorist Attack
Brief: Achile Lauro Hijacking, near Port Said, Egypt
Lesson 12: Terrorism, The United Nations, and the Future. Section 12.1: The United Nations and Terrorism. a) UN
Resolutions and Other Instruments against Terrorism. b) The UN Organisation Against Terrorism. c) Other UN Activities Indrectly
Affecting Terrorism .. Section 12.2: Terrorism and the Future. a) Technological Advantages of Security Forces. b) Political Integrity and
Will to Counter Terrorism. c) The Horizon. d) Possibilities to Effectively Defeat Terrorism. e) Keywords to Note. f) Terrorist Attack Brief:
Seizure of US Embassy and Hostages, Teheran,lran.
Annex k Internet Information Sites Related to Terrorism. Annex B: Glossary of Terms. Annex C: Ust of Groups Accused of Terrorism
by Govemments or MOOa. Annex 0: Intemationallnstruments; Prevention and Su~ression of Terrorism. Annex E: UN Resolutions on
Terrorism. Annex F: Intemational Terrorist Ids by Region, 2001. Annex G: Characteristics and Effects of Chemical W~s. Annex
H: Characteristics and Effects of Biological We~ns. Annex I: Characteristics and Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Annex J: Significant
Terrorist Incidents 1961-2001 (US State Department). Annex K: Ust of Terrorist Organisations, COIT'()iledby US, UK, and EU. Annex
L: Locations where AI Qa'ida Network has Firm Presence. Annex M: Militants' Presence (fought or trained in Afghanistan/Kashmir).
Annex N: Photographic Evidence: Armenian Genocide. Annex 0: Photogf'Cllhic Evidence: Nazi Genocide. Annex P: PhotographiC
Evidence: Chinese (Nanjing) and Asian Genocide. Annex Q: Photographic Evidence: Former Yugoslavia Genocide (Kosovo). Annex
R: Balfour DeclaratiorJlNhite P~eague of Nations Palestine. Annex S: Further Readng.
Final Examination.
This concludes the Summary of the Selected Work
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5. Evidence and Exemplification of Significant Contribution to Knowledge
Significant contribution to knowledge is provided by:
1. Pioneering Comprehensiveness
2. Precision Clarity
3. Relevance and Application of Global Terrorism
1. PIONEERING COrvlPREHENSIVENESS
Global Terrorism significantly contributes to knowledge by offering an amplitude in breadth
and depth that is uncharacteristic of peer topical works. It includes in a single edition: Academic
theory, diverse and wide ranging historical material, political material, technical material and
diverse, comprehensive reference databases, as follows:
A. Academic theory. Examples of this are found throughout Global Terrorism, in the form of:
i) Critical comparisons. An example of this may be found on pages 53 to 63, where pertinent facets
of the Middle East conflict are examined, including a critique of some underlying causes of this
continuing conflict which are rarely aired in public (see quotation of the late Professor Israel
Shahak, page 62).
ii) Penetrating scrutiny of events and trends. Examples of this are: The table of Trends and Events
Shaping Terrorism during the past 110 years (page 18), the Armenian Genocide Case Study (pages
145 to 154), and the Year-line: Events leading to attacks on u" September 2001 (pages 345 to
346).
B. Diverse and wide ranging historical material. Instances of this may be found throughout Global
Terrorism, a specific example being the reference to diverse instances of terrorism occurring down
the centuries from the ancient Persians to the 20th century (found on pages 28 to 36 of the published
work), which include brief mention of such diverse figures, groups and phenomena as: the
Hashishine; Guelphs and Ghibellines; Bindewurs; Vlad Tepes; Aztecs; the Witch craze; the
Inquisitions and the Consistory; Thugee cult; Piracy; the French Revolution; King Leopold in the
Congo, and the 19th century beginnings of the Armenian genocide. 20th century terrorism is narrated
in many parts of Global Terrorism in different contexts, but notably on pages 36-65. One of many
examples of diverse historical material may be found on page 191, where the Imperial Japanese
army's secret biological warfare unit (Unit 731), it's fate and its victims are mentioned. This same
army's more widely known but increasingly forgotten forays into sub-human savagery in Nanking,
China, and other pars of Asia, are examined in depth on pages 38 to 40.
Another example of diverse and wide ranging historical material occurs on pages 138 to
141, where the topic of insanity is dealt with, and notable mass murderers (construed to be on the
fringe of terrorism) are described, including Peter Kurten, Donald Gaskins, Pedro Lopez and Andrei
Chicatilo.
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C. Political material. Political references may be found throughout Global Terrorism, but specific
notable examples are: Reproductions of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, British White paper of 1939
and League of Nations Palestine Mandate (pages 529 to 544), and reproduced lists of proscribed
terrorist groups according to the UK, US and EU (pages 508 to 510).
D. Technical material. Technical material is not found in general works on terrorism. In Global
Terrorism however, issues such as the following are included: anti-terrorism techniques, logistics,
tactics, weapons and effect. A specific example is the section on weapons whose technical aspects
are discussed in depth (pages 175 to 200). Another example of technical material, also invariably
absent from works on terrorism (and practically non-existent in the public domain), may be found
on pages 321 to 327. It deals with practical anti-terrorism issues, such as choke points, kill zones,
target hardening, layered security zones, and immediaJe [medical] care.
E. Diverse and comprehensive reference databases. Diverse and comprehensive databases are
included in Global Terrorism. Examples of this are an international terrorism attack list spanning 40
years (pages 491 to 507); illegal arms bazaars in India (page 203); a list of all 122 contemporary
International anti- Terrorism legislation titles and serial numbers (pages 465 to 470); a glossary of
286 language, technical, slang and jargon terms related to terrorism (pages 391 to 402); a table
showing the basic details of 511 groups accused of terrorism (pages 403 to 464); tables of the 20
most common types of chemical and biological weapon, and explanation of nuclear detonations and
after effects (pages 472 to 490); a world map showing the ten countries where AI Qa'ida has
consolidated a firm presence (page 511); a world map showing the 90 countries where those who
have fought or trained in Afghanistan and Kashmir are currently present (page 5/2); a table of over
190 internet sites which are directly and indirectly of use in researching the topic of terrorism.
2. PRECISION CLARITY
Global Terrorism significantly contributes to knowledge by its quest for precision clarity.
This is achieved by first identifying all topics directly related to terrorism, then dissecting each one
into firmly segregated sub orders and variants. This is intended to provide students with an efficient
reduction of terrorism, which is essentially an abstract and somewhat uncharted subject, into
coherent, logical and manageable components.
The following are examples of this:
A. Constant elements of terrorism (pages 9S to 98) are divided into seven sub-orders and discussed
(cause or motive: ends and means,' ability,· calculation; terror,' victims, and targets).
B. Freqyently. but not invariably occurring elements of terrorism (pages ss to 98) are divided into
four sub-orders and discussed (recognition,' publicity: demands; coercion).
C. Self-justifications for terrorism (pages /13 to 123) are divided into eight sub-orders and
discussed (Cotfronting oppression; independence struggle,' resistance to military occuptition:
religious duty: poIitiCQI conviction,' social conviction,' pursuit 0/mystical, doomsday or Messianic
goals, and restoration ofpast social or religious l)'stem).
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D. Other examples are as follows:
i) Other motivations for terrorism (pages 129 to 143) are divided into nine sub-orders and discussed.
ii) Catalysts fortem>rism (pages 142 to 143) are divided into four sub-orders and discussed.
iii)Terrorist resources (pages 175 to 211) are divided into two main categories (weapons and other
resources). These are then sub-divided into seven and eleven sub-categories respectively, and
discussed.
iv) Further examples are: Profile characteristics of terrorists (reduced into 5 sub-categories);
terrorist acts (reduced into 13 sub-categories); targets of terrorism (reduced into 9 sub-categories);
victims of terrorism (reduced into 10 su1J..categories); weapons (reduced into 11 sub-categories)
and leadership (reduced into 4 sub-categories).
Clarity, in the sense of transparency being a part of that quality, has also been applied to
Global Terrorism by ensuring as far as possible, that impartial data and statistics were compiled.
This was especially important given the formidable distortion of select media material, fielded
seemingly by almost every side in armed conflicts, in order to further political and military
objectives.
3. RELEVANCE AND APPLICATION OF GLOBAL TERRORISM
The relevance and application of the research culminating in Global Terrorism have
significantly contributed towards Knowledge, as follows:
A. Relevance. The relevance of Global Tenorism lies in the fact that terrorism as a subject for
aaldemic study has grown in demand in the past few years, especially as a result of the events of
11th September 2001, but little exists in a format that lends itself easily to systematic study. This
interest bas been reinvigorated during the twenty-months of the aftennath of 11th September, as
several developed nations have engaged in a new type of warfare against the AI Qa'ida terrorist
network. which has resulted in so much social disruption and preventative activity. e.g. The
nationwide preparation of the UK. for dealing with a chemical, biological or radiological terrorist
attack.
Few, if any, peer works exist that permit a semblance of systematic study on all topics
directly related to terrorism. Such works tend frequently to be incomplete, or specialise in some few
subjects only, are unsystematic, vague or disorganised, or dwell on conjecture towards certain
obscure subjects as yet not entirely related to terrorism (e.g. Possible application of computer-based
neural networks to anti-terrorism). Global Terrorism is therefore comparatively effective in
satisfying a demand for the comprehensive and systematic study of terrorism.
B. Awlication. There are several factors whose application have enhanced Global Terrorism, thus
contributing indirectly to Knowledge:
i) Format
ii) Dissemination
iii) Recognition
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i) Format.
An important factor in the first stages of applying the research knowledge, was to present it in a
fitting format, in this case, an academic format conducive to study of the topic. This accounts for the
absolute and innovative dedication to learning format.
e.g. Distinct lessons with pre-defined scope (12); structured learning objectives (154); academic
narrative; enhanced learning narrative (bulleted text); full length case studies (4); genocide study
photo collections (4); short case-briefs (12); research annexes (19); tables (50); illustrations (475);
time-lines and year-lines (3); keyword tables (12 with a total of 114 entries); research website list
(200 entries); self-appraising tests (12 with a total of 240 questions), and a final examination (50
questions).
Notes: Another academic innovation aimed towards students, are the four collections of
photographs containing tragic evidence of genocide and war crimes in Ottoman Turkey, the Nazi
occupied territories, China, and the former Yugoslavia, which are provided on pages 513 to 527.
These 82 selected photographs animate the case studies and sections of text in Global Terrorism to
which they relate, with a realism not possible to convey by text alone (it is quite shocking material,
but that is most certainly not the intent).
ii) Dissemination.
Vigorous progress has been made in generating academic study of the topic, thus contributing to the
knowledge. This may partly be attributed to a certain attraction to the format, diversity and
comprehensiveness of Global Terrorism, and has happily resulted in its formal study by several
hundred students in 20 countries, at University (Graduate and Undergraduate) level, government
institute level, and in private capacity. i.e. Independent students, multi-discipline University
students, and security forces' personnel (including General Officer level).
To enhance the learning process, and by default, the contribution to knowledge as far as humanly
possible, I am continuingly and energetically available to all students of Global Terronsm, on a
voluntary and gratis basis, and act upon the input received from every student that completes as
requested, the UNITAR feedback forms. On the University courses in which Global Terrorism is
taught, I proactively seek a critique from all students, midway through each course, in the constant
quest for improvement.
iii) Recognition.
Recognition has been an important factor in disseminating Global Terrorism, but also in establishing
contribution to the knowledge. Besides satisfied students who have proven their assimilation
through the final examination in Global Terrorism, and promoted its dissemination amongst their
peers, important recognition was conferred by the UN Secretary-General. In his report to the UN
General Assembly concerning Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (Report A/55/179), he
briefly mentioned Global Terrorism, and its author.
This concludes the Evidence and Exemplification of Significant Contribution to the Knowledge
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6. Evidence and Exemplification of Original Contribution to the Knowledge
Original Contribution to the Knowledge is providedby two initiatives
A. Hitherto Unassembled Research Findings.
B. Creative Invention.
A. Hitherto Unassembled Research Findings
These findings encompass four subjects:
i) Statistical social profile ofKashmiri Militants.
ii) Table of 511 Terrorist groups (hitherto un-collated in a single work).
iii) Militant Groups hitherto unknown outside of Kashmir.
iv) Comprehensive statistics on the destruction of Kashmiri society (hitherto un-collated in a single
work).
A (i) Statistical social profile of Kashmiri Militants.
This profile does not appear in any published or unpublished work known to the candidate,
in the fields of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, Kashmir, sociology or anthropology. It is difficult to
conceive that this work could exist, owing to the physical impracticalities of gathering the data from
several sources on the Pakistan side of Kashmir, and also several sources on the Indian side of
Kashmir.
It is furthermore almost inconceivable to imagine that this research could be undertaken by a
non UN officer, given the political difficulties of access and in eliciting this type of information
from political parties, Mujahideen, soldiers, security, hospital and prison staff.
The statistics researched gave a clear profile of Militants (the regional word jor guerrillas
and/or terroristsy in the Kashmir dispute concerning: Age, education, background, and motivation
or cause of recruitment. It also sub divided the data into two categories of Militants: fully trained
and half trained. The most interesting research conclusion is that fully trained militants largely fall
into the 21 to 25 year old age group, have high school education, were labourers by occupation, and
who became Militants by virtue of becoming unemployed.
A (ii) Table of 511 Terrorist groups (hitherto un-collated in a single work).
This [Global Terrorisml table of groups accused of terrorism does not appear in any
published or unpublished work known to the candidate. It is unusually long, and most other lists of
terrorist groups are much shorter.
Moreover, most of the other lists in the public domain make no attempt at segregating
terrorist groups from guerrilla groups as the list in Global Terrorism does; it includes only those
accused of terrorism and not solely guerrilla groups whose warfare is sometimes lawful.
Furthermore, Global Terrorism almost invariably transIates the meanings of groups' names
when they are in a foreign language. This is not the case with almost all other lists in the public
domain.
The list of groups accused of terrorism contained in Global Terrorism was researched in
Lebanon, and in Syria and Israel during visits. Itwas greatly expanded by research undertaken on
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both the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir, within Pakistan and on a visit to Afghanistan
(Khyber Pass). It was supplemented in Europe after discussions with police in Switzerland and
Austria, and following contact with members of terrorist groups temporarily in custody of the UN
Security, prior to being handed over to Police.
Other contemporary lists of terrorist groups mix the categories and are smaller in size. e.g.
a) The US State Department (203 groups, entities and individuals listed).
b) Federation of American Scientists (387 liberation movements, terrorist organizations,
substance cartels, and other para-state entities listed).
A (iii) Militant Groups hitherto unknown outside of Kashmir and parts of Pakistan.
Painstakingly difficult research (please refer to section 8.,conceming research methodology,
for details of this) established the existence of the following terrorist groups in Kashmir, which are
unknown outside of Kashmir and tiny neighbouring parts of India and Pakistan.
These listed groups account for approximately 29010of the 101 Kashmir terrorist groups that
are listed in Global Terrorism between pages 403 to 643. Other works in the public domain that list
terrorist and other groups, usually list no more than a dozen Kashmiri terrorist groups in total.
Kashmiri groups unknown outside of Kashmir and tiny neighbouring sectors ofIndia and Pakistan
• Al Hadith • Khawateen Kashmir
• Al Inqualab • Lashkar e Ayubi
• Al lehadia Police Commandos • Laskar e Sajjad
• AI Karbala • Liberation Front
• AI Khomeini • Mujahideen Balakote
• Armed Forces of Medina (Pakistan) • Muslim Guerrilla Tigers
• Armed Islamic Movement • Partisans Movement
• Balakot Tanzeem • Pasbane Islami (Pakistan)
• Green Army • Pasdarani Islami
• Hizb ul Nissa • Rashid Khan Group
• Islamic Freedom Movement • Tarsq ul Mujahideen
• Islamic Resistance Force • Tehreek e Islami Jamhoria Kashmir
• Izrael Group • Organisation of Martyrs and Wounded
• Jawed Langra 1957-1994 (Pakistan)
• Kashmir Freedom Fighters • Zia Missionary Force
A (iv) Comprehensive statisticson the destructionofKashmiri society (hitherto un-collated in a singlework).
The statistics gathered on the destruction of Kashmiri society were collected in both sectors
of Kashmir, India and Pakistan.
Difficulties initially arose (please refer to section 8, on pages 28 to 33, concerning research
methodology, for further details of this) in obtaining accurate data, owing to the articulate fashion in
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which the dispute is politically exploited by nearly all parties involved, and it was in several ways
more difficult than gathering data on the terrorist and guerrilla groups in Kashmir.
There are few if any sources in the public domain which provide such comprehensive
statistical data on the destruction of Kashmir, and none from an uninvolved party that are
demonstrably unbiased.
Notable organisations that disseminate statistics concerning the destruction in Kashmir are
the Indian Army; Kashmir Media Service; Kashmir Liberation Cell (Azad Kashmir Government);
Pakistan News Service and Kashmiri Pandits Association (Panun Kashmir). With the partial
exception of the Kashmiri Pandits, the openly brazen bias in the tone of the remaining publications
casts serious doubt upon the accuracy of their data. In contrast, the statistics in Global Terrorism are
generated by neutral but penetrating and sceptical research.
In short, the statistics in Global Terrorism are impartial and of a comprehensiveness absent
from other statistical collections on the destruction of Kashmir. e.g. Global Terrorism includes data
concerning attacks upon civilians by guerrillas and terrorists, and explosions caused by guerrillas
and terrorists (subject headings that never appear in Kashmiri or Pakistani statistics). Global
terrorism also includes statistics concerning torture victims, those held without trial, and security
forces indicted for human rights violations (subject headings that never appear in Indian Army
publications). These are shown between pages 283 to 289 of Global Terrorism.
B. Creative Invention
Creative Invention is demonstrated in the following ways:
i) An original formula, applied to structure and rationalise all terrorist acts (invertible).
ii) A short definition of terrorism
iii) A full length definition of terrorism
B. (i) An original formula, applied to structure and rationalise all terrorist acts (invertible).
The formula on pages 93 to 94 of Global Terrorism, attempts to describe terrorist acts in a
scientific, logical and cyclic fashion. It is entirely original, but most notable on account of the fact
that it is cyclic, but also inverts and returns to the point of origin if demands are met (which is
precisely the case with terrorismi.
e.g.
Terrorism consists of four pillars:
MOTIVATION
OBJECTIVE
TARGET
ASSET HARM
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The context of this is as follows:
MOTIV AnON: Terrorists are all motivated. This motivation generates their objective
OBJECTIVE: Their objective determines what (or who) is to be their target
TARGET: The type oftarget they determine, decides the asset halm that is selected
ASSET HARM: Is hann or damage that coerces the target so as to achieve the terrorist objective
This cycle of violence continues until the demand disappears (terrorist apprehended or killed, situation
changes etc) or is met. Ifthe demand is met, the cycle reverses as follows:
i.e.
ASSET HARM overwhelms the
TARGET, who then concedes to the terrorist demands, thereby achieving the
OBJECTIVE of the terrorist, which in tum satisfies the terrorist's
MOTIVE
A practical or hypothetical example of this sequence is provided on page 94 of Global Terrorism.
B. (ii) A short definition of terrorism
A short, entirely original definition of terrorism is provide in Global Terrorism (please see
below). The definition is descriptive and no attempt at a legislative definition. It is notable in that it
mentions several factors not normally present in other definitions (pages 87 to 89 in Global
Terrorism serve as a comparator with nine other examples of definitions of terrorism from
individuals and governments). These points are
a) Abstract. The reference to 'abstract' is well founded as terrorism is only in recent years becoming
formally segregated on the law books into specific terrorism offences, such as membership,
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, and aiding and abetting the commission of terrorism.
b) Unease. Unease is a more realistic way in which to describe the effect upon the public. e.g. Few
members of the public in the UK overall, would experience terror if a PIRA bomb is detonated in
the City of London, but certainly widespread unease would be generated.
c) Military weaponry. h is a fBct that the level of force applied to innocent victims is well out of
proportion by the standards of conventional criminality. Military level force is used, with bombs sub
machine guns, hand grenades and the like, designed to kill trained, resourceful and evasive soldiers, not
unsuspecting and vulnerable civilians.
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d) Coercing and Punishing. While coercing is a common enough reason cited in definitions of terrorism,
punishment is rarely mentioned as a factor in terrorism. In fact it is often a factor when governments
refuse to negotiate or make concessions following a terrorist act and demand. Terrorist acts are often
repeated, partly to maintain the state of anxiety in the public (victims), and partly to coerce and punish
the target for non- oompliance.
SHORT DEFINITION:
The abstract (but increasingly legislative) term 'Terrorism' refers to criminal offences which
produce widespread popular unease (namely: murder, wounding, destruction and damage) through overt
and ruthless violence. These offences are mostly committed by groups, against random innocent victims
or specific structures or resources, using military weaponry, usually in order to coerce or punish
governmental authorities or commercial enterprises, for political or social reasons.
8, (iii) A full length definition of terrorism
A full length definition appears in Global Terronsm on pages 90 to 91 and is reproduced below.
Additional notes on this definition (provisos and notes) follow the definition on the same pages.
This definition is more inclined towards a legislative framework, encompassing types of existing
criminal offences, recognised targets, and several types of diverse motive, which are not normally
encountered in definitions (e.g. Pursuu of esoteric goals; such was the motive of the Aum Shinri Kyo
attack on Japan's underground train system. Another cited motive is enacting vengeance; this is often
the motive underlying almost cmrmonpIace terrorist bombings carried out against each other, by
members of Russian organised crime gangs).
FULL DEFINITION:
Voluntary aa(s) (or the threat), at any location, of
,. Murder » Abduction }> Theft
y Wounding » Depopulation }> Destruction or damage
by person (8), generating public anxiety, dwing peace, wartime or insurrection;
as a tactic to influence or coerce:
}> Governments ". Groups
". Organisations ". Individuals
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with the objective of:
'j.> Manipulating political,
ethnic or social change
'j.> Commissioning war crimes ~ Extortion of money, valuables
or crimes against humanity or services
.,. Deterring law enforcement ~ Enacting vengeance ~ Propaganda benefit
~ Pursuing esoteric goals
This concludes the Evidence and Exemplification of Original Contribution to the Knowledge
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7. Evidence and Exemplification of Equivalency to a Ph.D. by Conventional (thesis) Route
The University establishes the following standards for Research degrees at the Doctoral level
by published works.
Doctor of Philosophy by published works
'The standard for the Ph.D. by Published Works is equivalent to that of a Ph.D. by thesis. the
Candidate must have made a personal systematic study, normally in a single or related fields and
have shown originality by the exercise of independent critical power and make a distinct contribution
to knowledge. The candidate must have presented and defended the submitted works to the
satisfaction of the examiners '.
The points to establish in this section of the context paper are therefore:
1. Personal systematic study in a single or related field.
2. Originality through the exercise of independent critical power.
3. Having made a distinct contribution to knowledge.
1. Personal systematic study in a single or related field.
My studies, directly and indirectly related to the fields of terrorism and guerrilla warfare
occur(red) as follows:
a). Police service (Surrey and London), from 1975 - 81.
b). Army service (TAVR), Military Police and Infantry, 1981 - 83.
c). As a UN Security officiaVofficer in several UN countries and Peacekeeping Missions, 1983 - 2003.
d). As Political Assistant to the General Officer commanding the UN Mission in India & Pakistan, 1995 -97.
e). Continuing research for teaching Graduate / Undelglllduate courses on terrorism studies, 2000 to 2003.
f). ContiIuing research as a Terrorism subject expert for the UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Ops., 2002 to 2003.
g). Periodic participation in International Conferences on Terrorism.
h). Periodic seminars and training with the Austrian Anti-Terrorism Police.
i). Intermittent contact with members of national Police forces, and members of designated terrorist
groups in Europe, in my role as a UN Security official.
j). Continuing research as a Counter Terrorism Conalltant, Course Author, and Thesis Advisor (terrorism)
for the UN Institute fur Training & Research, since 1999.
25
2. Originality through the exercise of independent critical power.
Evidence and exemplification of original contribution to knowledge is discussed in depth in
Section 6 on pages 20 to 24 (Evidence and Exemplification of Original Contribution to Knowledge).
This originality is the result of exercising independent critical power in the form of selecting a
broad and diverse number of research methods, locations and sources, as portrayed in this table:
Country Locations Dates Sources Method of Research
.- ,
Italy Courmayeur Sep2000 ~, ElI"OpOI, Italian State Police, FBI, New 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
(3 days) Scotland Yard, GSG-9, UN ODCCP (UN 2. Conference Reports.
Intemationlll Conf8fence on TfIfTOfIsm). 3. Analysis.
4. Further enquiry where necessary
Austria Vienna Mar 1998 Ausbian and UN Ubraries. State Police. Anti- 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
to Terrorism Uni (WEGA A/atm8btelung and AbteIung 2. Conference Reports.
Nov 2002 Em). Gendarrner1e. Australian Federal Police 3. Book Research.
(visIing). MexX:an Cot.riter Terrorism Police. UK 4. Internet Research.
National Criminal Intelligence Service and MI5 5. Media magazines.' newspapers
officers. UN ConferenceS on Temxism. Books and 6. Further enquiry where necessary
Internet (residence). Media.
SWlzer1and Geneva Oct 1997 UN Litnry. Federal Police. Canton Police. PKK 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
to Assyrian LIleraIion Front. Kosovo liberation Army. 2. Interrogation of PKK, Assyrian
Mar1998 Books and Irtemet (residence). Media. Liberation Front and Kosovo Uberatlon
Army prisoners.
3. Own Book collection
4. UN Library
5.lntemet
6. Media magazine I newspapers
7. Further enquiry where necessary
Atta&al· I<hyber Pass. Jan 1997 Sea.dy ~ ffon1ier fcft:e Reginert. 1. DiscI ISSitrJaI enqliries Inote&., week. SrnggIeIs. local UN sf1IIf, Taliban. Arms
11'1CIIUactueIS.
Pakistan, P!,!kisnlnl Azad Libraries. UN Miliary Archives. Police. Army 1. Discussional enquiries ( notes.
Azad Kashmir: Islamabad, personnel. Prime Mnister's Cabinet Division 2. UN Military Archives
Kashmir Rawalpindi, Secraariat. UN MIIary Observers. Local UN staff. 3. UN Political Archives
Peshawar, Sefid Inter Services Irtelligence. Mbnts (JKLF, HarlGlt uI 4. Libraries
Doh, Astor, Gilgit, Ansar, TaIiban, HizbuI Mujahideen, Indonesian 5. Media
Skardu, Domel, Jamiah JsIamI). ReIjgious Schools (Deenie 6. F~lnvesUgaUons
Rawalalrot, KolI, ~ Bookslni lr*met(rasUance). 7. OWn Fietd & Poti:aI Reports
SiaIIrot, BhirTiIa'. 8. F~ enqtiry where nee!!!. 'I
Muzaffarabad. Nov 1993 Army personnel. National Secuity Guard (NSG I
to Black Cat Commandos). UN MilIary Observers.
Inch, Incia l Jam!mj Kashmir Sep1997 Local UN starr. UN MHary IPolitical Arc:tMIs. Border 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
Jammu ~ Security Force (BSF). JK Police (JKP). Joint 2. Field Investigations
Kashmir New Delhi, Srinagar, ~ten ogation CenIre (JIC) staff. HospIaI staff. 3. Own Field & Political Reports
State BaramuHa, Poonch, MiIibris (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF], 4. UN Military Archives
Rajouri, Jammu. HarIGIt uArsar, JK Plebide Front. IzraeI Group). 5. UN Political Archives
Counter Mllants Okhwan uIMusIimoon). Media. 6. Further enquiry where necessary
Itwas during the above period in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, that the former experiences and training in the Police, Army (TA VR) and UN
Mission in Angola were formulated into written notes for later use in the published work.
731ocations within six
UN operation Jan 1989 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
Angola
provinces: Luanda, to UN Military ObserVers, MPLA (FAPLA soldiers), 2. UN Military Archives
SalnlerO, Luena, UNrrA (FALLA guenIas), Media. 3. UN Political Archives
Huambo, Mavinga May 1991 4. Further enquiry where necessary
and lubango.
Lebanon Naqoura, Tyre, Binet Jul1993 UN Troops (UNIFIL). UN Mftary Observers 1. Discussional enquiries I notes.
Jubail, Ein EbeI, to (UNTSO). local UN staff. SoUh Lebanese Army 2. UN Military Archives
Beirut, Saidon, Nov 1993 MiItia (SLA) or DeIacto Resistance Foroes I OFF), 3. UN Political Archives
Shtoora I Jdehdeh. LebaneSe Army. Lebanese Gendarmerie. Syrian 4. Further enquiry where necessary
Sep1987 Army. Israeli Defence Force (IDF). SoUh Lebanese
to General Sect.rity Service (GSS). Former nrnates cl
Jan 1989 I<hiam Jail I II~I Cer*e.. Media.
Contacts isted in this table are desaibed in further detail Annex 0
,
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Further evidence of originality through the exercise of independent critical power is partly
discussed in Section 8 on pages 28 to 33 (Account and Critique of Research Methodologies used in
the Research).
3. Having made a distinct contribution to knowledge.
Distinct contribution to the knowledge is substantiated in depth in section 5 of this Context
Statement on pages 16 to 19 (Evidence and exemplification of significant contribution to
knowledge), and so therefore, only the main concepts of section 5 are reproduced here:
Distinct contribution to Knowledge has been provided by:
A. Pioneering Comprehensiveness
This is provided by: Academic theory; diverse and wide ranging historical material; political
material; technical material; diverse and comprehensive reference databases
B. Precision Clarity
Identification then dissection of terrorism topics into segregated sub orders of coherent, logical and
manageable components.
C. Relevance and Application of Global Terrorism
The relevance of Global Terrorism is established by the nature and format of the research vis a vis
the massive interest towards studying the subject, generated by the events of 11th September 200 1.
The application of Global Terrorism has been enhanced by its format, dissemination and
recognition.
'I1lB conduda the Evidence and Exemplification ofEauivalency to a Ph.D. by Conventional (thesis) Route
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8. Account and Critique of Research Methodologies used in the Research
This section is divided into two parts. The first deals with the subject heading in general, and
also some instances of inadvertently stumbling upon material and circumstances useful to the
research.
The second part elucidates some of the difficulties in achieving accuracy, and uncovering,
verifying and establishing data, as well as some examples of how physical evidence sometimes
played a role in ascertaining culpability for terrorist attacks.
The type of research methods, locations and sources are tabulated in brief form on page 26 of
this Context Statement, in addition to which, human sources' contacts are listed inAnnex D on pages 39
to 42 (Frequency and schedule of meetings that generated research information).
In General
The part time field research, written, and other activities for this published work amount to
approximately 1900 hours during a period of about seven years. This seven year period occurred in
an overall period of nine years (from 1988, when I began researching, until my return to Europe in
1997) within which, my leave periods amounted to a total of approximately two years.
Idivided the research enquiries into three main categories of source - formal published work
(please see Annex J), media reports (TV, magazines, Newspapers, periodicals and later, the Internet)
and human sources I witnesses. While the former were relatively easy to access, the latter were a
more difficult prospect. Nevertheless, Iadopted the frame of mind that I was very fortunate, from a
research point of view, in being on the ground in some of the longest ongoing low intensity conflicts
in the world, and with some credentials to facilitate access and research 24.
That motivated me to use my initiative and energetically engage in the widest possible range
of activities imaginable, in order to construct as accurate a picture and data as possible, and Iset my
goals with an attitude that nothing should be impossible in this regard since Iwas in the midst of the
conflict with practically unlimited freedom of movement and a degree of protection.
The types of witness sought our reflect this thoroughness, and vary from the range of
protagonists on all sides, to media, hospital and interrogation centre staff, and naturally, the UN
Military Observers that I worked alongside.
Contacts for the purposes of this research fell into two categories; formal and informal. Most
meetings were clinical and fruitful to an extent, while a number could at best be described as banal.
Meetings with irregular armed elements (guerrillas and terrorists) were usually quite
different however, nearly always informal, and generally difficult to arrange, since in many
scenarios, these men were in hostile military operational zones, potentially risking their lives and the
security of others in talking to strangers.
In contrast to this, some few meetings, notably in Lebanon and Pakistan, where the armed
elements were mostly on safe ground, were not so difficult to arrange. Some meetings developed
from chance encounters. The following somewhat colourful example illustrates this, and also the
sometimes chaotic backdrop to the war and the research environment:
One day in 1988, a machine gun jeep arrived at my village house in south Lebanon, and three
men with small arms alighted. They were South Lebanese Army (SLA 25) men who conveyed to me
the message, in pigeon English and Arabic, that unless I vacated the house within 24 hours, it would
be blown up. The leader of this group was one Aachel Hashem (a regional SLA since assassinated
following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon), a brutal thug, with a heavily postured sense of false
honour and pride, but with a generally adolescent disposition. The grounds for this threat were that
the previous tenant was ejected in my favour (a myth - it was unoccupied when I rented it, and it
~·1UN Officers enjoy a level of freedom of movement and access, rarely afforded to, for example, students or visitors.
:, South Lebanese Anny - Israel's former swrogate militia in the self-proclaimed security zone inside southern Lebanon
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involved in a variety of lucrative illicit business under
cover of the war, which was enmeshed with his military Nathia Gali Bill Station, Pakistan. Indonesian
activities, including gold and narcotics smuggling, and religious. students who were travelling with
trafficking in foreign prostitutes - an issue opposed by a assaultrifles and a rocket-propeJJed grenade.
local priest, and for which he was very nearly murdered by Hashem.
Another unusual opportunity for research occurred when I visited the house of a UN
colleague in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Three students (oj the same nationality - Indonesian) were staying at his house on and off while
they studied at a local religious school (Deenie Medresseh) after the Murree Hills. My colleague was
quite shocked to tell me that this religious school (located at a Hill Station town called Nathia Gali)
must be a hub for Mujahideen. He had noticed that when the students had arrived at his house on the
previous evening and proceeded to unload their baggage from the car, it included very muddy combat
boots, a rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7 VL) and assault rifles (AK47). Meeting these students
provided me with much research information from one of them, despite the predictable reticence,
suspicion and hostility for non Muslim westerners from the others.
There were other research enquiries that occurred quite by chance. e.g. I was travelling one
morning on my way to the UN Cantonment Headquarters through the Saddar Bazaar, Rawalpindi.
I noticed a large billboard depicting
a blind and dumb UN Secretariat building
and an Indian soldier engaged in atrocities.
One of my part time functions (Field
Security Officer), provided me the
opportunity to investigate this further with
local police and intelligence personnel, and
as a result, a new group involved in the
Kashmir conflict came to light (pasban or
Guardians).
Having returned to Europe after a
thirteen year sojourn in the war zones of the
field, and being in the UN security field of
work, I turned to local and international
police contacts for further relevant sources
of research information.
I also unexpectedly had opportunity
later transpired that the truth was that my neighbour, an
SIA intelligence man, wished to appropriate the house in
which I lived as I had restored it to such a habitable
degree). The subsequent majlis (the Arabic word jor
coun el, meaning practically, an audience with an
authority figure - a regional custom in the more primitive
or isolated parts oj the Arabic cozmtries) with a powerful
figure in the same village resulted in a meeting with
Hashem, ritual drinking of tea, and the matter being
resolved.
I was fortunate to turn this series of unhappy events
into a research opportunity (and from which others
sprang), and Hashem provided significant and relevant
information, especially concerning the opportunism that
sometimes motivates terrorist leaders. Hasbem was
Billboard in Raw alpindi P~ critical of UN and India,
re,eaJed a T1C" armed group called Pasban (Guardians).
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to gather some relevant information from members of
terrorist groups 26 taken prisoner during violent incursions
into the United Nations estate in Geneva.
In gathering research material, the method of
questioning adopted was essentially that used by police
officers when conducting an enquiry or investigation. If it
concerned an incident, the essentials were first established
(i.e. timing, date/day, venue, perpetrators, witnesses,
supporting evidence, and sequence of events).
This would be followed by cross questioning in
general, or aimed at possible inaccuracies, exaggerations or
outright prevarication.
If it concerned a trend, statistical data was collected
wherever possible. All human sources of research
information were asked how their information might be
confirmed or verified, and this frequently led to me to
meetings with further sources.
A detailed schedule and frequency of these meetings
that generated research material is reproduced from my
diaries in Annex D. In Section 7 (page 25) is a table which
provides an overview of my research activities in terms of Victimsof rape and other assault in a
location, method and sources. Srinagar hospital (Rainawan")
Some research in Kashmir was simply too sensitive
to publish. I compiled a list of the Joint Interrogation Centres 27 where torture occurred (See annex E),
and talked to several witness-victims of two ncs. I had furthermore plotted a map of the militancy and
the illicit training camps (Please see Annexes F and G)
Research in Angola was somehow a different research climate, being chiefly a conflict in which
guerrilla warfare prevailed, with elements of terrorism being less distinct. Nevertheless terrorism
occurred; innocent civilians were subjected to random bombings and atrocities.
Some few conversations with
UNITA members were possible, especially
after the political agreements (the pre-
cursor to a SUPfXJsedpeace), which brought
UNITA offices into the capitol and many
major cities of Angola.
A perhaps non-conventional
example of terrorism occurred during a visit
to the UNITA stronghold of Mavinga in
Cuando Cubango province.
I witnessed one situation, in which
a UNITA guerrilla was held to a tree with
barbed wire. He had stolen a wristwatch
from another UNITA soldier, the penalty
was that he would be disembowelled the
Thi Kashmiri prisoner had hi eyes 'taped-up' and is
undergoing an e cruciating torture known as the 'Aeroplane',
inflicted b) a member of the BSF (Border Security Force).
26 KLA (Ko )\'0 I ibcration Army or U. htria Cltnmtare E Kosows UCJ....').Assyrian Liberation Party tHezb 1I1 Tahir AI
hur) and PKK (Pm11.1'G Karkercn Klirdl.\1OJI or Kurdi: tan Workers Party) which in 2002 changed its name to the Kurdistan
Freed III and D m ra ngress (Kongreya .tzodi u DClIlokrasl,veyaKurdistane or K1DEJ....).
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,:oolbmal.lon of'the &...-dcr ecurity Force (BSF), Army and Central ReS<.TYePoli c Force (CRPF) .
next moming.
This was supposed to instil an extreme sense of honesty or
fear amongst the guenillas.
Our persistent pleas for a lesser penalty resulted in his
release with a punishment of hard labour.
We all (of the UN party, with no power to otherwise
intervene) strongly suspected that he was brutally murdered after
our departure.
Subsequent enquiries via the UN Military Observers
proved fruitless - no acknowledgement of his existence by
UNIT A came forth,
On accuracy, forensics and other difficulties
a). When consulting with police officers from Italy, Austria,
Switzerland and Interpol, I generally accepted their infurmation
and data (but sometimes confirmed it with a second police source),
since their standards are high, and they are the only repositories of
many types of relevant data
Most importantly, they are uninvolved in political
so ereignty disputes with the armed groups of terrorists and
guenillas that they are charged to pursue. They are therefore free
from tactical pressure to distort or suppress data in the way that the
pakistani, Indian, Afghan and Lebanese Police forces are,
conceming the various armed conflicts in which they find
themselves involved. The Police forces of western Europe are moreover well established and of a higher
standing and independence, making them far less susceptible to political control or manipulation, than
their unfortunate counterparts in the developing countries.
Remain of mortar rounds fired
across the Line of Control
(Kashmir ceasefire line) with
identif~ing batch numbers
stamped on their tail fins.
Remains of a surface-to-surface
missile (4 inches wide) that struck a
UN Field Station (at Poonch,
Kashmir) in May 1995. Note
stencilled batch Dumber from which
much may be deduced.
b). When dealing with research of an incident or trend in
Kashmir or Lebanon (mostly ceasefire violations by government
armies, guerrillas and terrorists), the description of events or data
would frequently be underplayed, distorted, inflated, or in some cases
denied altogether. In this environment, it was necessary not only to
refer to the versions of events from both or more parties, and
witnesses, but nearly always to official UN reports known as SitReps
(Military and Political Situation Reports). These were compiled by
military staff or by myself in Kashmir, as a result usually of attending
the scene of an incident, or if a trend, by monitoring it closely over a
period of time.
c) In cases where evidence was still lacking, it was occasionally
possible to utilise physical evidence found after searching the scene
of the incident. This sometimes revealed certain types of round or
weapon used exclusively by one side or another, occasionally with
serial number markings. This provided strong circumstantial
evidence, especially in cases involving larger weapons. e.g. Militants
in Kashmir possess no tanks and limited types of surface to surface
weapons.
The fresh remains of a tank: round or a Katyusha rocket
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would therefore almost conclusively implicate a formal armed force
or government army, since Militants did not possess the launch
platforms for such rounds.
d) Gathering data on infiltrations or violations of ceasefire lines
was somewhat more difficult and occasionally involved use of night
vision devices. i.e. A certain sector of one area would be
independently observed for a month, then infiltration figures
compared with those of the defending forces.
e) Great difficulty was initially experienced in identifying
armed groups in Kashmir. By learning a limited select amount of
Urdu and Arabic vocabulary, this problem was much alleviated. The
various problems encountered were as follows:
I It was a tactic adopted by the Mujahideen in the
Soviet Afghan war of 1979 to 1989, to invent as many
names as possible of Mujahideen groups, as well as distort
the names of existing groups. The objective was to confuse
and overload the Soviet intelligence machinery. This tactic
has been adopted by Militants inKashmir.
ii The status of Kashmir alternates between that or a war and a low intensity conflict. In
this sort of climate, it has happened, for example, that an enraged group of three local youths has
procured some Kalashnikov AK 47 assault rifles and some hand grenades, then gone out and
declared themselves to be a resistance, guerrilla or Mujahideen group, shortly to be captured or
never to engage in armed operations. This is of course not an authentic terrorist or guerrilla
group, and the only way to discern such fictions was to enquire with other armed groups,
ecurity forces, hospitals, media and residents (both indigenous andforeign) and observe local
events and news for substantial periods of time.
A one kilogram steel shrapnel
fragment (part of the rotating
motor-propulsion unit) from a
surface-to-surface missile, of a
type for which Militants groups
had no launch platform.
iii Another difficulty in confirming the existence of a bona fide terrorist group were the
actions and claims of groups that did not in fact exist, but were covert actions (or psychological
operations) by intelligence services engaged in discrediting the opposing side. This was
sometimes attempted and achieved by what are known as 'false flag' operations (explained on
page 135 of Global Terrorism), in which a protagonist commits an act but leaves evidence or
disseminates information that incriminate the opponent.
One such suspected false 'group' is mentioned on page 446 of Global Terrorism; the National
Revolutionary Army.
1\ Groups with similar names were initially a problem to differentiate. e.g. Iqhwan ul
Mu limeen (Mu lim Brotherhood - a Militant group) and Iqhwan ul Muslimoon (also
grammatically correct and meaning Muslim Brotherhood; but in fact a counter-militant group,
mprised of former converted or 'turned' Militants who had been captured by security forces).
\ Further difficulties arose with groups who adopted names from other conflicts. e.g.
I larnic Jihad (holy strnggle). It had to be determined whether or not these were visiting
members of groups (called guest Militants by the security forces, an example being the few
member of Afghanistan's Taliban that appeared in the Kashmir Valley in the mid 1990s), or an
independent, indigenou new Kashmiri group of the same name.
\ I Each word in the name of a group had to ,be carefully evaluated to give an initial
direction to the re earch of the group. e.g. Groups callmg themselves for example Al Karbala or
Hizbollah would lead one towards the Shia Muslim sectors of the population (as oppose to the
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Sunni Mu lim sectors) owing to Shia associations with the city ofKarbala in Iraq and Hizbollah
in Lebanon being a Shiite (or Shia) group.
11 Other confusions sprang from the custom in this region to frequently intersperse Urdu,
Punjabi or Kashmiri, with odd words of English. e.g. 'Bhartiya Janata Party' (meaning Indian
Peoples Party, pronounced as Bartiya Junta Party). By knowing that 'Bhararat' (pronounced as
Bart) means India, any armed group associated with Kashmir and with this word in its name,
could immediately be discounted as a Muslim group, since most Muslims in Kashmir wish to
eparate from India, and those that do not, have no armed groups.
viii Confusion caused by careless translation sometimes created difficulties. e.g. Harkat ul
Mujahideen (Holy Warriors Movement) would appear in a newspaper as Holy Warriors Group
(Group i Jama 'a not Harkat).
ix Variations in spelling 2 generated much extra work. e.g. Ahle Hadid (Ahle Hadith), and
Balakot (Ba/akote), a1thou!W it must be said that there is no ruling on phonetic variation in
transliteration since Arabic 9 consonants are not the same as English ones, and Arabic vowels,
like English ones, vary from district to ilisUict 3(). There is a somewhat more scientillc. method of
writing Arabic sounds pbonetically in EogIisb, but that first requires a knowledge of Arabic.
Abuse of abbreviation, syntax and grammar in the media also accounted for initial
difficulties and much extra work:. e.g. The JK Plebiscite Front would also be described variously
as the Plebi cite Front or Jammu Kashmir Plebiscite Front.
Mujahideen in Balakot (generally meaning militants somewhere in the area of Ba/akot)
would be described in some media as Balakoti Mujahideen, sounding like a specific group
name, and in tum be twisted to become Ba/akot Mujohideen, sounding very much like a specific
group.
Khawateen meaning sisterhood was a prefix and suffix on three distinct and separate
groups. Media would sometimes simply abbreviate this to Khawateen, regardless of the group.
AI Badr would be variously described as Al Bodr or Al Badr Mujahideen.
Most confusing was Harkat ul Mujahideen and Harkat j Mujohideen. The 'ul' is Arabic
and the 'i' is Urdu, both meaning 'the' (but translatedpracticaJly as 'of). These are two distinct
terrorist groups, but elements of the media would frequently report them variously and
carelessly .
., The English grammatical syntax, peculiar to some classes in the region, also gave rise to
confu ion and extra research effort, on occasion. e.g. the following is an extract from a media
newspaper story:
"He, allegedly, burnt alive two persons while setting their shop onfire in Lines Area".
We might understand from this, that while setting a shop on fire, the accused also
engaged in etting two people alight in a somehow distinctly separate incident. In fact, the
persons died as a result of being trapped in the shop fire, and they were not set on fire
pecifically or independently of the shop fire.
ln~ concludes the Account and Critique of Research Methodologies used in the Research
1I111anlgroup in Kashmir gcn rall~ speak Urdu, Kashmiri and Punjabi with some English, but adopt group names in
rabic that bcinu the languag of til Holy Quran, and they being Muslims wishing to pay tribute to the book. In Islam,
nothin l is parable from th religion in luding politi ,goyenurent and anncd conflict.
Knshnuri and Paki~:ull group frequently ad pi Arabic language names since they are Muslim, view their conflicts as holy
m " and m id th lan nnec of the Koran a sacred and to be emulated,
rdn to til pun 11 ofT.E. Lawrcn on Revolt in the Desert (1926).
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9. Critical Review: Candidate's Development as a Researcher over the Period of Research
The period of purely field research (1988-1997), launched relatively well, partly owing to investigative
skills previously acquired during my police service (1975 to 1981) and as a Security Officer in the UN (first
tour, 1983-1987). This had taught me well, the virtues of thoroughness, sharp attention to detail, vision,
srpporting sources, types of evidence, scepticism and persistence .
By the time I was serving in the UN in Lebanon (1988-1989 first tour), I was quite well versed in some
of the military matters in which I had initially been grounded during service with the TA VR (1981 to 1983).
Much however, was learnt from the Military staff in Lebanon whom I worked alongside in the UN. Theirs was
a role similar to academic research in many ways; they would have to investigate (ceasefire and other violations
in difficult circumstancesi, use their initiative in so doing, then begin to verify and support their information,
and on some occasions, to later prove it.
When this military experience was coupled with the investigative qualities acquired in the police and
later in the UN security services, Ihad become perhaps passable at research.
Given the freedom of movement in the UN areas of operation (relatively scfe for UN personnel in
those times, the Cold War having barely ended), and the fact that these were war zones in which there were few
visitors, including other researchers, Iwas consequently able to research thoroughly, unrestrained, and on the
whole, was quite well received.
When in India, Pakistan and Kashmir, I studied fur degrees by distance learning with the Pacific
Western University (the only type of study that I could engage in given my high mobility and very limited
communications focilities in the field), which called
for a deal of research, and which permitted me to
develop those research skills particularly concerned
with published, written, and media material.
Teaching Graduate and Undergraduate
courses at the American Military University (part of
the American Public University System) since
February 2000 has required continued research
activity to keep me abreast of the topic (terrorism),
using and honing those skills that I had acquired
some years ago now.
It is a difficuh task to judge ore's own
development as a researcher, without perhaps either
overrating or understating it I would hazard an
estimate, that my development as a researcher is
most likely at the required standard. I can say with
all certainty however, that my research was driven
by persistence and determination, motivated by a
strong desire to expose, in an academic fashion, the
full measure of witnessed human tragedy which
both generates and executes terrorism (the topic of
thepuhli~~~. ~----------------------------~
Conversations with members of groups like this, yielded
much researcb material Tbis group is the JK Ikhwan
(Jammu Kashmir hrotherhood); a counter-militant group
consisting of fonner militants who changed sides after
capture and now fight for the Indian security forces. In the
foreground centre is their leader; Kuka Parrey, a former
folk singer whose real name is Jamsbeed Shirazi, and
whose main income is from the lumber bu iness - a shady
enterprise protected by force of anns.
This conclude. the section on the Candidate's Development as a Researcher over the Period of Research
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10. A description of the Limitations of the Research
The limitations of the research were as follows:
a). Practical limitations. Occasionally, I oould not gain access to a specific area for security reasons (usually in
Lebanon, on account of shelling or small arms fire), but this was not a severe limitation and only temporary.
On other occasions, Iwould gain access to a witness who proved to be uncooperative or outright hostile. This
again was not a serious limitation, since itwas usually possible to find alternative witnesses or sources.
b).Geographical / Climatic limitations. In one sense, there were geographical limitations, since it is not
possible to be in multiple locations simultaneously. i.e. Itwas not possible to so intimately monitor terrorism
in the middle east dispute , when located in Kashmir and vice versa. Nevertheless, sufficient periods were
sequentially spent in these locations to acquire a strong appreciation of the conflicts and gather substantial
research material concerning the terrorism elements. I dwell on the middle east and Kashmir since these are
the two longest ongoing conflicts in which terrorism is a major consideration.
Very occasionally meteorological conditions hampered research in India and Pakistan. e.g. One day,
I had arranged through a local UN staff member in Srinagar to meet amember of the Srinagar museum staff
who lived some distance from Srinagar at Islamabad (not the Islamabad in Pakistan, but a city south east of
Srinagar, called Anantnag by Hindus, and Islamabad by Muslims). This worker was apparently making an
illicit living, based at his residence, by selling museum artefacts on the black market.
My interest was that he was also apparently a former member of a hardline militant group, Hizbul
Mujahideen. Iwas unable to visit his house owing to the Monsoon - the banks at the side of many roads had
simply collapsed; a seasonal norm
[~ erumaJS exIeIt if tJas regular and cIirmJic dJrMlx:d (Iunvn WI)' weD to (M/' forbearers wJv
served in /rrJia during the R£g rob1ia/ 0CCUJXIIim (N' empire periOCP is ilJustraJ«l by thejx:t thJt th! Chief Military
Observer ad sk:fI(minus mysef, being oiteave et the time) Ittl to ciJan:bJ the sk!II vehcIe mid-rot¥J, as the rood
rapidly beame a smaO /ake, rising by iIrhesper minute, ad eventually, the 4-whee1 drive UN vehicle limentirely
~ Wewere all tpite intimae with the regiaI, aswere the InJim adPcidsbti !ddiers (/RMn as ~
or .hKms) wIv often a::cat1fX111ied us - but the masoo« efficts are simply wpredictab1e - animany tIrJu!Dnis cl
traveOers ae 11It6'CXn8dte11fXrdlyea:h)ft7 insuch~].
Very occasionally, a witness (or l)would simply be unable to honour a pre-arranged rendezvous for
other climatic or health reasons, !nch as on a day with an eKtraordinary hot temperature, or on account of
suffering from complaints such as malaria, tuberculosis (prolific on the continent) or intestinal disorders and
the like. The entire Indian !nb continent is stricken by an almost unbelievable poverty and consequent
sickness is prevalent, except amongst a tiny elite and foreigners.
c). Political limitations. In some few cases, particularly regarding research ofKhiam jail (sooth Lebamn)
and at the interrogation centres in Jammu & Kashmir, Imet with firm resistance, periodic surveillance for a
while, and was warned off with the possibility of consequences should I not desist. Nevetheless, I managed
to talk at length with two former inmates of Khiam (one male and one female), and a worker in an
interrogation centre in Kashmir (at great risk tohimself). The greatest political limitation was being unable to
p... tbr:R'.IIird IDIIIKDIlinA~E.. F 1IIdG.ltwwld ~powW"lqlc ! '. rapullC, pobIbly
fiom all parties to the ~*. tu: ~ the aftamath mthe evau <X 116 Septamcr 2001, 1hat is
probably now rnthe case. Please refer to Annex Hto view a threat received from two local Kashmiri groups
based inRawalpindi Pakislan, concerning UN observation.
d). Pqsonal Limitations. Not being a University chair or otherwise having established a brilliant or
exceptional mind, Iam of course certain that my research could be better, and that furthermore, there can be
no limit for improvement. I know well that my research was inclined towards a military or police bent, but
also that this was not entirely inappropriate for the topic, and that it gleaned appropriate results.
This concludes the section on the Limitations of the Research
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Annex D
Frequency and Schedule of Meetings that Generated Research Information
Location Sources Dates Type Remarks
Interpol 22I0912OOO Meetings' data' discussions International terrorism
23I0912OOO Meetings' data' discussions Hamas. Hlzbaliah
Europol Z210912000 Meetings' data, discussions Intemational terrorism. PKK
23I0912OOO Meetings I data I discussions Middle East Groups
24I0912000 Meetings' data I discussions Ai Qa'ida
Italian State Police 2410912000 Meetings' data' discussions International terrorism
US FBI 22I0912OOO Meetings' data, discussions Middie East Groups
Italy (Federal Bureau of 23I0912OOO Meetings' data I discussions Intematlonal terrorism
(Courmayeur) Investigation) AI Qa'ida
International New Scotland Yard 22J09I2OOO Meetings' data I discussions International terrorism
Conference 23I0912OOO Meetings / data I discussions International terrorism
on Terrorism AI Qa'ida
GSG-9 24I0912000 Meetings' data / discussions Intemational terrorism
(German An6-Terrorism Unit)
UNODCCP 22J09I2OOO Meetings I data' discussions Intemational terrorism
(Drug Controi and Crime 23I0912000 Meetings / data / discussions Middle East Groups
Prevention Programme) 24I0912000 Meetings' data I discussions United Res__ponseto Terrorism
~ Meetings I data, ~ International terrorism
07/00l2000 Meetings / data, disc:Ul8ions PKK
19I0812000 Meetings / data' discussions AI Qa'ida
15I0912000 Meetings' data' discussions AI Qa'ida
21/1112000 Meetings / data' discussions Intemational terrorism
0410312001 Meetings' data' discUSSions Middle East Groups
27l04l2001 Meetings / data' discussions PKK
09/05I2001 Meetings I data I discussions International terrorism
17/0812001 Meetings I data I discussions International terrorism
11/0912001 Meetings I data / discussions AI aa'ida
12/0912001 Meetings' data I discussions AI aa'ida
13/0912001 Meetings' data / discussions Alaa'ida
1410912001 Meetings' data / discussions AI aa'ida
Austrian state Police 15l09l2001 MeetIngs' data J dIaa.-ions AI aa'ida
Anti Terror1st Unit 27/0912001 Meetings' data, dlscuaaions AI aa'ida
lWEGA A1armabteilung) 0211012001 Meetings' data, discu88lons AI Qa'ida
1511012001 Meetings' data' discussions AI aa'ida
2811012001 Meetings' data I discUSSions AI aa'ida
Austria 1311112001 Meetings / data I discUSSions PKK
2311212001 Meetings' data, discussions International terrorism
0210112002 Meetings' data' discussions International terrorism
0410212002 Meetings / data I discussions AI Qa'ida
26l04l2002 Meetings / data' discUSSions International terrorism
11l06l2002 Meetings / data' discUSSions Middle East Groups
0110712002 Meetings / data / diSCUSSions Internationai terrorism
13l06l2002 Meetings' data I discussions AI Oa'ida
Zl1rSI2OO2 Meetings I data, diKuaaions PKK
1011012002 Meetings / data, dt.cu.ions International terrorism
0211112002 Meetings' data' discussions AIOa'ida
Austrian State Police 02I0412000 Meetings' data' discUSSions International terrorism
(Abteilung Eina) 09/05I2001 Meetings' data I discussions International terrorism
11l09l2001 Meetings/ data / discUSSions AIOa'ida
27/0912001 Meetings / data / discussions AIOa'ida
04l02l2002 Meetings / data' discussions International terrorism
15J0912OO2 MeetingS / data, diSCUSSions International terrorism
Austrian Gendarmerie 12/0912001 MeetIngs / data' discUSSions AIOa'ida
UK National Criminal 1210612SJOO Meetings I data, diSCUssions International terrorism
Intefflgence Service 13/0912001 Meetings I data' discUSSions AIOa'ida
_(British E~ Vienn~
MIS (viaiting VIenna) 11m12OO1 Meetings I data I di&cuasions Intemalional terrorism
Meldc:al ~ Terroriam Police 15l09l2002 Secure E-maMexchanges Infiltrating AI Qa'ida
Australian Federal Police 2911012002 Meetings I data' discussions AI Qa'ida
(viSIting). Jama'ah Islam~h
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Frequency and Schedule of Meetings that Generated Research Information (continued)
Location Sources Dates Type Remarks
-Swiss Federal Police 1311211997 Meetings 1 data 1discussions PKK
07/0211998 Meetings 1 data 1discussions International terrorism
2810211998 Meeti~/data/dlscussions AI Qa'ida
-Geneva CftonaI PoIce 02111/1997 ~I datal discllSSians Middle East Groups
Switzertand 1311211997 Meetiros I data IdiscllSSians International terrorism
(Geneva) 09101/1998 Meetings 1 data (discussions AI Qa1da
2210211998 Meetings 1 data ( discussions PKK
2610211998 Meetings 1 data 1discussions International terrorism
-PKKiKurdistan Worker's Party) 1511111997 Interrogation 1discussions Arrested bY UN secUritY
-Assvrian Uberalion Front 1211211997 Interroaation 1discussions Arrested by UN security
~ Liberation Army 2210211998 Interroaation 1discussions Arrested by UN security
-Secuity Police 15101/1997 Meetings 1 discussions
17101/1997 Meetings 1 discussions
21101/1997 Meetlnas 1 discussions
-Frontier Force Regiment 15101/1997 Discussions Smuggling 1Terrorism
1610111997 DiscUSSions Terrorism
1710111997 Di8cussions AI Qa'ida
Afghanistan 1810111997 Discussions Mujahideen
(Khybef Pass 1Agency) 2110111997 Discussions Securitv
"""'IUYYR"" 18101/1997 Discussions WeaDons
-Taliban 19/01/1997 Discussions Reliaion 1Kashmir
-Arms manufacturers 15101/1997 Discussions Weapons 1Smuggling
20101/1997 Discussions 1Weapon tests
UN Mission (UNMOOIP) In India. Pakistan and Kashmir, from November 1"3 to Septmlber 1987
('VIoIatIons'refer to ceasefire vtoIations)
-UN Military Observers Daily Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militantsfvlolations
Pakistan; Ra~ndi -UN Local staff =- Discussions Militancy~ 0i8cussi0ns Tenorism I SecurityUNMQGIPWI R HQ ~'(MbnIs) =995 Meeting 1disc\8sion TerrOlism 1KashmirMeetings 1 discussions Terrorism 1Violations
-PM's cabinet DIvision SeaetarIat Tri-MonthIy Meetings discussion Kashmir I Militancy
-Police W~ Meetings 1discussions Terrorism 1Security
Pakistan; Islamabad -Army WefJdy Meetings 1 discussions Terrorism (Militancy
UNGOMAPHQ -UN ~ OI:ar\4ers~P) Fortnightly Meetings 1 data 1discussions Terrorism 1Militants
-Media Weekly Meetings discussions Kashmir ( Militants
~ama'ah Islamiyah 15101/1995 Discussions Militancy 1Jihad
ndonesian 'Guest Mltants')
-Taliban 1610311997 Discussions Jihad
Pakistan; Peshawar ~OUSSchoo 1910311997 Discussions Islam 1Jihad
Medresseh)
Pakistan; Sefid Doh -REligious Schoo 2010311997 DiscUSSions Jihad
lOeeilie Medresseh)
Pakistan -UN Military Observers BI-annual Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militantsfviolatlons
Northern Areas' Astor
Pakistan -Icier Services IntelUgence 0510611997 DiSCUSSion Operation Topac
Northern Areas; Gilgit -Army BI-Annual Meetings' discussions Terrorism 1violations
UN Field Station -UN ·MiIitarv Observers BI-Annual Meetlnas' data 1discussions MilitantsfVlolatlons
Pakistan -Police Annually Meetings' diSCUSSions Terrorism 1Security
Northern Areas; Skardu -UN Military Observers Bi-annual Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militants/violationsl
UN Field Station ~ous Schoo h) 10/07/1996 Discussions JihadMedresseh
Pakistan -Police Bi-annual Meetings 1 diSCUSSions Terrorism 1Security
Northern Areas; Kargil -UN Military Observers BI-annual Meetings 1 data 1discussions MilitantsfVlolations
UN Field Station
Azad KastYnir; RawaIaI«t ~ Bi-Monthly Meetings I <f18CUB8ions T errOlism I VIOlations
UN Field Station -UN Mbrv Observers BI-Monthlv Meetlnas 1 data I discussions MilitantsMoiations
Azatj Kashmir; Kali -Army BI-Monthly Meetings 1 discussions Terrorism 1VIOlations
UN Field Station -UN MiHtarv Observers BI-MonthIY Meetinas 1 data 1discussions MilitantsMolatlons
Azatj Kashmir; Sialkot
~Observers
Bi-Monthly Meetings' diSCUSSions Terrorism 1Violations
UN Field Station Bi-Monthly Meetlnas I data 1discussions Militantsfvlolations
Azatj Kashmir; Bhimbar -Army Bi-Monthly Meetings 1 data 1discussions Terrorism 1Violations
UN Field Station -UN ·MiIitaIV Observers Bi-Monthlv Meetinas 1 data 1discussions Mllitantsfvlolatlons
-JKLF (Mitants) 13108f1996 Discussions Idata Jihad
Azad Kashmir; 20/1211996 Discussions 'data Separatism/Kashmir
Muzatrarabad 04!0311997 Discussions ldata Militancy
-Taliban (Militants) 07(0311997 Discussion Jihad
-JKLF (Mftaris) 1310811996 DiSCUSSions Militancy
Azatj Kashmir; Domel 2011211995 Discussions Militancy
UN Field Station 0410311997 DiscUSSions Militancy
-Police Bi-Monthly Meetings 1 diSCUSSions Terrorism 1Security
-UN Whrv Observers Bi-Monthlv Meetinas 1 data 1discussions Militantslviolatlons
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Frequency and Schedule of Meetings that Generated Research Information (continued)
UN Mission (UNMOGIP) in India, Paklst ... and Kashmir, from November 1.. 3 to Sept.-nber 1887
"\noIatIons' refw to cHsefire vIoIationsl
Location Sources Dates Type Rema!1(s
India: New Delhi -Army Bi-annual Meetings 1 data 1discussions Violations
UNMOGIP -UN Miitary Obsefvers Bi-annual Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militants/violations
UAISON OFFICE
-Army Daily Meetings 1 data 1discussions Violations
-National Security Guard (NSG) 23107/1997 Discussions Militancy
-UN Miliary Obsefvers Daily Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militants/violations
-Border SecurIy Faroe (BSF) Daily Discussions Militancy
~KPoIice Monthly Discussions Militancy 1Arson
-CenIraJ Reserve Police Faroe Monthly Discussions Militancy
Jammu Kashmir State; .Joint Irterrogation Centre (Red 1) 24107/1997 Discussion Militancy 1 Interrogations
Srinagar - Vdims of interrogation centres 13I00I1996 Discussions; Shalimar Inter. centre Torture methods
UNMOGIP -Hospital (Netvu. Rainawan) 13I00I1996 Discussions Torture 1 rape 1murder
SUMM!;B HQ .Janmu Kashrnr Lh Frort (JKl.F) 0110611996 Meetings 1discussions ldata Independence 1Militancy
05/0611996 Meetings 1discussions Idata Weapons
00I00I1996 Discussion Counter Militancy
-JKlkhwan 1210611996 Discussion Accession 1Jihad
-Har1<at uI Ansar 1510611996 Discussion ldata Jihad 1Pakistan
-Hizbul ul Mujahideen 18/0611996 Discussion Kashmir dispute 1Militancy
~KPlebisciteFront 2910611996 Discussion Militancy
..tzraeI QtqI Weekty Meetings I DiIIaaions I data Kashmif dispute IMiIbncy
-Mecia Daily Meetings I discussions Kashmir dispUte 1Militancy
-UN Local Staff 03107/1996 Meetings' discussion 'data Counter Militancy
-COlrier MiItanIs
oQhW8r;. uIMusIimoon)
Jammu Kashmir State; -Army Monthly Meetings 1 data' discussions Violations
Baramulla -UN MHary Observers Bi-Monthly Meetings 1 data 1discussions MilltantsMolations
UN Field Station -UN Local Staff Monthly Meetinas 1 data I discussions Militancv
Jammu Kashmir State; -Army Monthly Meetings 1 data 1discussions Violations
Poonch -UN MIIary Obsefvers Bi-Monthly Meetings I data, discussions Militants/violations
UN Field station -UN Local Staff Monthly Meetinas' data' discussions Militancy
Jammu Kashmir State; -Army Monthly Meetings 1 data 1discussions Violations
Rajouri -UN Miliary Observers =hlY Meetings' data' discussions Militants/violations
UN Field Station -UNLocaI~ Meetiniis J daIa J di&ws&KJllS
Jammu I<ashJnW State; -Army Monthly Meetings I data I discussions VIOlations
Jammu -UN MIby Observers Bi-Monthly Meetings 1 data 1discussions Militants/violations
UN Field Station -UN Local Staff Monthly MeetiOQS1 data I discussions Militancy
UNMIssIon in ~ (UN InIa1m Fora In Lebanon or UNFIL). Sept&nb... 1.7 to.-....y 1_ and July 1983 toNowmber 1983
rVJolllllons're" to cu_tIre violations and Inllltrdonsl
Location Sources Type Dates Rema!1(s
-UN Military Observers (UNTSO) Discussions Weekly Violations
-UN Battalion Troops (UNIFIL) Meetings I data Daily VIOlations
-Lebanese Army Discussions Monthly Civil War I Terrorism
-Lebanese Gendarmerie Discussions Bi-monthly Civil War I Law and Order
Naqoura -Israeli Defence Force ~ Discussions Monthly Terrorism 1 Infiltration
-Sth. Lebanese General . Service (GSS) Discussions Monthly Infiltrations
-Media Discussions Monthly Terrorism' civil war
-South Lebanese Army Milit~8 Discussions Weeldy Warfare 1 infiltrations
(SLA or Defacto Forces 1OF
-UN Battalion Troops (UNIFIL) Discussions 1data Tri-monthly Violations 1Terrorism
-Lebanese Gendarmerie Discussions Tri-mon~ Civil War I Law and Order
Tyre -Hizballah Discussions 06l04I1 Jihad
Alma a' Shab -Israeli Defence Force (IOF) Discussion 2OI05!1988 Violations' attack
-SoUh Lebanese General Secuty Service ~ Discussions Weekly Warfare I infiltrations
~ormer ilmates; I<hiam Jail 1Interrogation Discussions 1410611988 Torture, murder, rape
Discussions 2O/OSI1988 Torture, murder, rape
-South Lebanese Army Militia Discussions Weekly Warfare 'Infiltrations
(SLA or Defacto Forces 1OFF)
Binet Jubail -UN Battalion Troops (UNIFIL) DiscUSSion 2311211998 Violations I Terrorism
...soAl Lebeneae General Secuty Service (GSS) Discussion 2311211998 Infiltrations
-South Lebanese Army Militia DiscUSSion 2311211998 Warfare 1 infiltrations
(SLA or Defacto Forces 1OFF)
Ein Ebet -Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Discussion 2411211998 Violations 1Terrorism
-SoUh Lebanese General Secuty Service (GSS) Discussion 2411211998 Infiltrations
-South Lebanese Army Militia Discussion 2411211988 Warfare I infiltrations
(SLA or Defacto Forces I OFF)
CONTNJED···/
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Frequency and Schedule of Meetings that Generated Research Information
(continued)
CONlHJED"'/
UN Mission In ~ (UN Int8rim Force In ~ or UNFIL). S..p(..l11b.. 1887 to January 1888 and July 1183 to November 1183
('\IJoIMIons'refer to ceaseftre vlollltlons and Inlltndlons'
Location Sources Type Dates Remarks
Beirut -UN Military Observers (UNTSO) Discussions Monthly Violations
-UN Battalion Troops (UNIFIL) Meetings! data Monthly Violations
-Lebanese Anny Discussions Monthly Civil War
-Lebanese Gendarmerie Discussions Monthly Civil War! Law and Order
-Syrian Anny Discussions 1910311988 Civil War / infiltrations
Discussions 2510611988 Civil War !infiltratlons
-Media Discussions BI-annually CMIWar
Saidon -Lebanese Anny Discussions 1510811988 Civil war !infiltratlons
-Palestinian Uberatlon Organisation Discussions 1510811988 Infiltrations
Shtoora / -Lebanese Gendarmerie Discussion 2010911998 CMlwar
Jdehdeh -Syrian Anny Discussions 20/09/1998 Civil war
2510911998 Civil war
UN Angola Vertnc:.tion Mission (UNAVEM) from JanUliry 1888 to May 1"1. UNAVEM II from May 1"1 to December 1•• 2
('\IIoIal#ons'refer to violations of wlthdraw'lll .nd surrender of weapons)
Location Sources Type Dates Remarks
73 locations where there was an -UN Military Observers Discussions Daily Civil war Molations
established UNAVEM presence, - MPLA (FAPLA soldiers) Meetings! data Monthly Violations
within six UN operation provinces -UNITA (FALLA guerrillas) Oiscussions Bi-Monthly Civil War / Violations
(Luanda, Saumero, Luena, -Media Discussions Weekly Civil War! UN ITA
Huambo, Mavinga and Lubango). -General Consca;:Ao (MPLA) Discussion 08l08I1992 Impending outbreak of war
These operational provinces were
in tum located within Angolan
national provinces, namely:
Bengo; Benguela; Bie; Cabinda;
Cunene; Cuando-Cubango;
Cuanza-Norte; Cunaza Sui;
Huambo; Huila; Lunda-Norte;
Lunda- Sui; Luanda; Malanje;
Moxlco; Namibe; Uige and Zaire
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Annex E
List of Interrogation Centres (ICs) and Joint Interrogation Centres (JICs)
SRINAGAR
Old Airport JIe. The largest IC in a former Army Camp. Most Mujahideen are brought here. Facilities provide for up to 500
persons to undergo torture at anyone time.
Red-16 Ie. This is, with some brazenness, next door to the UNMOGIP Snnagar HQs. at the fOOt of the Suleiman mountain
Previously occupied by the JK Police, the CRPF 30 and BSF 31 run it.
Hurl Niwas Ie. This was once the Srinagar residence of Maharaja Hari Singh. CRPF run, it is the most barbaric.
Bad2.3Dl Bagb le. Inside 'Batwara' Army HQ, very old and notorious, it is next to the Broadway Cinema.
Totoo Ground Ie. Previously an Army training ground, it is inBatrnaloo, next to a major bus-stop.
Degree Colle2e JIe. The former Bernina college; CRPF and BSF use it for residence and as an Ie.
Papa-2 Ie. This IC is run by 8th Battn. of the BSF and is located in Sonawari.
Badami Bagh Ie. This IC is located inside the Army Camp.
Pantta Cbowk IC. This IC is located within the BSF Camp.
Sonwar Bagb JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF and CRPF.
Raja Bagh JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and JK Police.
Bagb e Mehtab JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF and CRPF.
Seki Dafar ne. This Joint IC is run by the Police and CRPF.
Panorama Ie. This IC is located on the by-pass road and is run by Police.
Bagb e Ali Martin JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Zaknra JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Tail Ba! JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Shalimar JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Shah Cinema JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Neelam Cinema JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
Hawa! Cinema JIe. This Joint IC is run by the BSF, CRPF and Army.
All Police Stations in the Srinagar District.
BARAMULLA
Du-Ie-Aab Gbah le. A former fruit-juice factory, 6 km from Sopore where the Jhellum & Nala Puhru rivers meet It is the
largest IC in Sopore.
Thimaia Centre Ie. This Ie is loo:Jttrl inta: l~ BaramuIIa InfuntIy Division 00rracks (housed in aformer cinema called ThimaiaHalJ.)
Watlab Rest House Ie. A former rest-house, it is strategically sited at the Sopore 1_ cross-roads and hill-tracks.
Government De2ree College Ie. This Ie is located inside a BSF Camp at Sopore.
Gulmarg Ie. This Ie is located inside the Baba Reshi Army Camp.
Baramulla Ie. This Ie is located inside Singh Pora Anny Camp.
Wadoora College Ie. This Ie is located inside a BSF Camp at Sopore.
Sundarwani IC. This Ie is located inside a BSF Camp at Bandipora.
Pattan Anny Camp Ie. This IC is located inside an Army Camp.
Doab Garb Ie. This Ie is located inside a CRPF Camp.
Dawar Gurez Ie. This IC is located inside a BSF Camp.
All Police Station in the Barnmulla District.
BADGAM
Fir Bagh le. This re is run by the Intelligence Branch
Kakao Rim Chari barif Ie. This Ie inside the BSF Camp.
Badgam Ie. This IC is located inside Khan Salub Army Camp.
Town Hall Ie. This Ie is located inside the former Town Hall and is run by the CRPF.
HMT Ie. This Ie is located inside Zaina Kate eRPF Camp.
Ompura le. This re is located inside a CRPF Camp.
Cbana Pora Ie. This Ie is located inside a BSF Camp.
AIl Police tations in the Badg;nn District
This suspect was released from a
JIe with extensive bums and
other torture marks.
urity Force
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ISLAMABAD (ANANTNAG)
Doon> Sbahabad IC . This Ie is inside the ArmyCamp.
Khanabal Ie. This Ie is located at the Police Lines (Station Cantonment).
Banibail Ie. This Ie is inside the ArmyCamp.
Chattergul Brah Ie. This Ie is inside a BSF Camp.
Kbundroo Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Om Gund Ie. This Ie is inside the Anny Camp.
Bejbeharra Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
AU Police Stations in the Islamabad (Anantnag) District.
PULWAMA
«aka Pora Ie. This Ie is inside a BSF Camp.
Balev Gund Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Sbopian Ie. This re is inside a BSF Camp.
Pulwama Police HQ le. This le is inside the Cantonment Police Lines.
Boonara Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Awanti Pora IC. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Tral Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Aii"Poiice Stations in the Pulwama District.
KUPWARA
City Centre Ie. This Ie is located in the former Police Station in Kupwara town.
Ka1i Mitti Ie. This Ie is inside the BSF Camp at Zangli.
Trebgam Ie. This Ie is inside the Anny Camp.
Rest House Ie. This Ie is inside Kamah Army Camp.
Kupwara Police HQ le. This le is inside the Cantonment Police Lines.
Battergam Ie. This Ie is inside the BSF Camp.
Chowkibal Ie. This Ie is inside the Army Camp.
Drugmulla Ie. This Ie is inside the Anny Camp.
JAMMU
Canal Centre Ie. Situated on the Jammu canal, this IC is also the JK State Headquarters of most Indian Agencies
and paramilitary forces, such as the CRPF, BSF and RAW 32.
Blindfolded suspected Militants rounded up and en route to an Interrogation Centre
the Research & Analysis Wing. TIu is a main Indian security and intelligence organisation.
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Annex G
List of Kashmiri Militant (Guerrilla/Terrorists Training Camps / Staging Areas
TRAINING CAMPS (MOST IN AZAD KASHMIR & PAKISTAN WITH A FEW IN THE JK STATE):
Abbottabad, Alakot, Alha ka Ghera, Aliabad, Arza, Athmugam, Attock, Autmoquam, Bagh, Barakot,
Betal Put, Bhatapora, Bhimber, Calnari, Chattar Ambore, Chenari, Chhattar, Cuttock, Dhana, Domel,
Garmi, Garhi Dupatta, Garmi Habibullah, Gilgit, Gojra Fort, Gund, Haji Pir, Hajira, Hallam ShumaIi,
Hollapo Jungles, llaqa Bair, Jabri, Janglo Mangal, Jari Kas, Kamri, Kel, Khost, Kohat, KotIi (2; one at
city Match Factory), Kucha, Lahabad Pur, Lahore, Larkana, Leswa, Lipa, Makri, Mang Basri, Mansara,
Mirpur, Murree, Muzzafarabad (capital city ofAzad Kashmir. in many ways a sort offocal centre.fQr
Militanc;y and with at least 10 training camps. including one in the city Match Factory and one in the
Sharkot lines), Nausheri, Panandri, Pantachowk, Peshawar (in 3 Afghan refugee camps), Pir Panjal,
Rawalakot, Sangli, Saphota, Sargodha, Shahid Abbazi, Shakkot, Sialkot and Shardi.
TRAINING CAMPS IN AFGHANISTAN (SEVERAL NOW ARE NON OPERATIONAL) :
AI Badar (3 camps), AI Fatah, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kosth, 8 others at least, locations unknown.
STAGING AREAS (MOST WITHIN THE JK STATE, SOME IN AZAD KASHMIR):
Bararnulla, Domel Bridge Police Station, Dundhial, Garhi Dupatta, Kel, Khojabandi, Kupwara, Lipa
Valley, Sopore, Tejian and Nekrun.
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Annex H
Threat received from two local Kashmiri groups based in Rawalpindi, Pakistan
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Annex I
Miscellaneous Notes
Certain events in which I was involved over the years, although not research activity, have
provided a deal of insight into the topic (terrorism) of the selected or published work; Global terrorism.
These activities have permitted me to write from the position of first hand experience, on certain
apsects of the topic, mostly concerning the use and effect of lethal force involving military style
weapons.
These events are as follows:
1) Being on police duty at the Iranian Embassy siege in London (April/ 980).
2) Being part of a [high securiOl] London police station team, securing an important terrorist awaiting
trial.
3) Being under attack by an SLA (South Lebanese Army) tank while travelling in a vehicle.
4) lading an Angolan Government Infantry platoon during attacks by armed elements upon the UN HQ.
5) Being under intermittent bombardment for three days (Angola) by light to medium infantry weapons.
6) Negotiating release of myself and another UN staff member (UNFAO) from armed elements,
following the resumption offull scale civil war in Angola (October /992).
7) Being on the scene of the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad (November /995).
On a different note, I was happy last year to receive a surprise communication from a Police
Major serving with the UN in Kosovo, to the effect that the information in Global Terrorism had been
put to some practical use. It mentioned that his men responded to a multiple terrorist bombing incident in
a nearby village (Vin-na, in the Gnjilani region) in the early hours of the morning. He withdrew his men
as a result of what he had read about terrorism tactics contained in Global Terrorism. His men were
consequently saved from further explosions in which some KFOR (Kosovo Force - a NAW led
military force) troops were tragically blown up and injured.
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Bibliography of Books Read during the Period of Research
(the details of'between 20 and 30 books are not shown on this list)
Title Author / ISBN PublisherEditor
1. A Gazetteer of Kastmlr (1873) C.Bates - Superintelldent orGov. Printing
2. A Iouchof"", BruwWCave 1H7782032 Paragon
3. Adolf HIller J.ToIMd 034629470X Ballantine
4. Before their Dlaspora W. KhaIIdI 0887282288 Inst. for Palestinianstudies. Wash. DC
5. BiologIcal Warfare and Terrorism USA AnnyICDC - USAmry
6. Birth of a tragedy: Kastwnir Prof. A. '--nb 0807129072 Roxford Books
7. BrokenUves Col. B. Stewart 0006382681 Harper Collins
8. c'! Systems 1993 ... Peter Raclcham 0710610734 Jane's
9. Countering Terrorism through international CooperatIon ISPAC(UN) - UN
10. Crusaders JonesIEreIra 066337007 BBCBooks
11. Dark Nature Lyall Watson 034061787X Hodder & Stoughton
12. DIrty Tricks or Trunp cards R.Godson 0766806991 Transaction
13. Gazetteer of Kashnir & Ladakh (1891) QuaI1ennlItw' 9893101047 Sang+MeeIGeneral or india a.ihore)
14. GoebbeIs R.Reuth 0151380786 Harcourt Brace
15. tistoricaI dictionary of II!norism AndersonI Sloan 0810841010 ScancroW press
16. History of KasM*: A study inDoct.ments (1916-1939) Mirza HuS1I8in 9694150302 NIHCR Isllnabad
17. History of theWortd J. M. Roberts 0195210433 Oxford UP
18. India: Torture, Rape and Deaths in Custody Amnesty 0939994739 John D. Lucasinternational
19. Inside Terrorism Bruce Hottnan 0231114680 Columbia
20. 1nl Instnments related to the prevention and suppression of UN 9211336317 UNIntet'IMItionaI terroI ism
21. InteIIgenCe w.rare Col. W. Kennedy 0517412640 Crescent Books
22. Jade The Ripper: A-Z Begg,FIdo& 0747244456 headlineSkinner
23. Kast1n* & UnIted Nations ShannaMd 8174680615 AImoI PublicationsBakshl
24. Kastmr during Brttish Rule ShannaMd 8174880569 AmIoI PublicationsBakshl
25. Kastmir In the Crossfire V. Schofield 1860640362 1.8. Tauris
26. Kastmr: A dlspWld legacy Prof. A. l.anb 0195774736 Oxford
27. KGB Deriabln & Bagley 0870528041 Hippocrene
28. KGB today J.Baron 0340352124 Hodder & Stoughton
29. Kovoet J.Hooper 1868121674 Southern BookPublishers
30. MassIICnt at Mamedy C.WhIting 0812880277 SteIn & Day
31. MeIn~ A. Hitler 071265254X PImIlco
32. My Ufe: A FnIgI'IWIt Maulana Jauhw - NatIonal ~ Trust(Inell
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Title Author /Editor ISBN Publisher
1. Peacekeeping & Pubic Information LLehmann 13679880 FrankC8ss
2. Promise of Hope Col. M. Cook 0241134676 Penguin
3. Pumel's Histoty of the Second Wor1d War (vol. I-VII) Purnell · Purnell
4. Rebel Hearts K. Toolis 0330348482 Picador
5. Ronmel C. ~1gIas Ikme · M-.y BookSociety
6. SAS. mustrated Histoty B. Davies 1862276818 Virgin
7. Secrets and Stories of the War (1863) •Vokmes I& •
u. Gen. Sir Brian Readers Digest
Horrocks ·
8. Security and CcHn Equipment 1893-4 IanVHogg 0710610812 Jane's
9. SS Werewolf Combat Instruction Manual
M.Fagnan 0873642481 Paladin Press
n
10. Supremely Abominable Crimes Edward a.mnan 0860318286 A&B
11. Terrorism: An introduction J.White 0534526993
West Wadsworth
12. Terrorism in the 21· century CindyCambs 0130208876 Prentice Hall
13. Terrorism Today
Spindlovel 0023017317 Prentice Hall
Simonsen
14. Terrorism: A global SlM'Vey
Amelia 0710616627 Jane'sttt..q)hrevs
15. The AngJo-Boer Wars M.Barthorp OM7444336 &ok Books 1nl
16. The Ber1in Bunker J. O'Donnell 0088216808
ArraN Books
17. The BIlle. ~ and COIIdensed. 0276420136
Reader'. DIgest-
18. The Blue Hemets ~ Edition UN 9211006112
UNDPI
19. The Century of Warfare C. Messellger 0002115&468
Harper Collins
20. The Chinese Secret Service FaIigotIKauIfer 0747233683
Headline
21. The Elite: Stoty of the Rhodesian SAS B.CoIe 0620074213 Three Knights
22. The end of the ~ Reich Gen. Chulkov · USSR
23. The rnt day on !he SClnme (1971) M.1\tiIeflrooke - MBASLondon
24. Theilalg of SS ObertIgruppenUnRl!intad Heydlich C. Mac:DonIIId 033354Ct2a MKMiIIn
25. The KnIghts of Bushido Lord Russell · cassell
26. The Nazis and the Occult NlSklar 08802M124 Dorset press
27. The Nemesis File P.Bruce 1867821361 Blake
28. The New Pakistan S.Kurnar 0706906322 Vlkas (India)
29. TheNu~Raid M. Middlebrook · -.yBook Society
30. The Operators J.Rennie 07126m06
century
31. ThePeacekeepers otKasb1* P.Dawson 8171546815 PopUlar (India)
32. The Rise and faI of the ~ Reich W.Shirer 06717286" SinOn & Schuster
33. The Road to Khartoum C. Trench 0880291624 Dorset press
34. The Scourge of the swastika Lord Russell · cassetl
35. The Sinai Peace Front B.stemfelt 18S066090X C.Hurst
36. The Spear of Destiny T. Ravenscroft 0877286470 Weiser
37. The war years Inpictures (voll-VI) Odhams - Odharns
38. 1'heSIUUS &GIosswy c:lalywmWlg & c:cr*t p1M!I1IiOn Alex Sc:m1id - EraIIdJS lJnw!niIy
39. western Responses to Terrorism Alex Schmid 0714646214 FrankCass
40. WitchcraZe A. Barstow 006260049X Harper Collins
50
Notes
(For use ofDirector of Studies and Examinin2~, if desired)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
51
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
52
